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T́ıtulo
Aprendizagem por Reforço Hierárquico no Comportamento e no Cérebro
Resumo
A aprendizagem por reforço (reinforcement learning, RL) tem desempe-
nhado um papel fundamental na compreensão da neurobiologia da apren-
dizagem e da tomada de decisão. Em particular, a associação entre a ac-
tividade fásica de neurónios dopaminérgicos no tegmento ventral e o erro na
predição de recompensas (reward prediction error, RPE), quantificado se-
gundo o algoritmo de diferenças temporais (temporal-difference learning,
TD), constituiu uma descoberta chave na consolidação da relação entre
neurociências e RL. Esta descoberta permitiu o avanço do conhecimento
na distinção entre comportamento habitual e planeado, condicionamento,
memória de trabalho, controlo cognitivo e monitoração de erros. Além
destas contribuições, RL facilitou a compreensão dos défices cognitivos pre-
sentes na doença de Parkinson, depressão, défice de atenção e hiperactivi-
dade, e impulsividade.
No entanto, a maioria dos modelos de RL testados em neurociências
tem uma capacidade limitada de aprendizagem de problemas complexos,
nomeadamente à escala ecológica do comportamento humano. Esta res-
trição é um problema bem estudado em aprendizagem de máquinas, onde
é conhecido como a maldição da dimensionalidade. Das várias soluções
propostas, destacamos a aprendizagem por reforço hierárquico (hierarchical
reinforcement learning, HRL) dada a prevalência da noção de hierarquia em
psicologia e neurociências. Os métodos HRL facilitam a tomada de decisão e
aprendizagem através da divisão hierárquica entre acções. Hierarquia neste
contexto significa o parcelamento de acções subordinantes, que produzem
recompensas (e.g., fazer café), em acções subordinadas (e.g., abrir a lata do
café, aquecer água), uma caracteristica ub́ıqua do comportamento humano
e animal.
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A investigação apresentada nesta tese testou a hipótese que as estruturas
responsáveis por RL estariam também envolvidas em HRL. Especificamente,
que a actividade das áreas aferentes aos neurónios dopaminérgicos estaria
associada a erros de predição ao ńıvel de acções subordinantes (pseudo-
reward prediction errors, PPEs).
Antes de investigar as respostas cerebrais a PPEs, uma série de es-
tudos comportamentais, em humanos, procurou determinar se os resulta-
dos de acções subordinantes tinham uma influência nas escolhas de partici-
pantes diferente de recompensas primárias ou secundárias. Como previsto,
os participantes escolheram com vista à maximização de recompensa, sem
qualquer efeito de acções subordinadas. Este achado foi fundamental para
excluir a possibilidade que erros na predição do resultado de acções subordi-
nantes (PPEs) sejam RPEs. No entanto, de acordo com HRL, preferências
por resultados de acções subordinantes foram reveladas quando os parti-
cipantes se encontravam no momento de efectuar essa acção ou quando
as escolhas não implicavam uma mudança de recompensa primária ou se-
cundária.
Através de ressonância magnética funcional e electroencefalograma, em
três estudos, foi demonstrado que actividade no córtex cingulado anterior
(dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, dACC) esteve correlacionada com PPEs.
Estas respostas reflectiram diferenças na magnitude, mas não no sinal, dos
PPEs, em conformidade com o envolvimento desta área em aprendizagem
por surpresa. Finalmente, um estudo adicional, com ressonância magnética
funcional, procurou comparar directamente as respostas cerebrais a RPEs
e PPEs. Foi encontrado que a actividade em dACC apenas reflectiu a mag-
nitude, mas não o sinal, do erro de predição. No entanto, apenas se obser-
varam respostas a RPEs e não a PPEs. Postulou-se que esta dissociação
se tenha devido a competição no processamento de informação proveniente
de acções que produzam recompensas finais e de acções subordinadas. Esta
hipótese seria compat́ıvel com a primazia do efeito motivacional de acções
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que produzam recompensa sobre acções subordinadas, em concordância com
os estudos comportamentais referidos anteriormente. Em nenhum dos es-
tudos de neuroimagem foram observadas respostas estriatais a PPEs ou a
RPEs ao ńıvel de accões subordinadas — apesar de ter sido replicado o efeito
conhecido a RPEs monetários. Esta resposta selectiva de áreas aferentes de
neurónios dopaminérgicos, e a dissociação observada no estriado entre RPEs
em acções subordinadas e RPEs monetários, sugere que a dopamina não seja
responsável por tomada de decisão em domı́nios hierárquicos.
Em conclusão, esta tese incita à inclusão de mecanismos hierárquicos
nos modelos existentes de RL. Além desta extensão, permite o avanço do
conhecimento da função de dACC, relacionando esta área com a tomada de
decisão hierárquica.
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Abstract
Reinforcement learning (RL) has provided key insights to the neuro-
biology of learning and decision making. The pivotal finding is that the
phasic activity of dopaminergic cells in the ventral tegmental area during
learning conforms to a reward prediction error (RPE), as specified in the
temporal-difference learning algorithm (TD). This has provided insights to
conditioning, the distinction between habitual and goal-directed behavior,
working memory, cognitive control and error monitoring. It has also ad-
vanced the understanding of cognitive deficits in Parkinson’s disease, de-
pression, ADHD and of personality traits such as impulsivity.
However, the RL models that have mostly been tested in psychology and
neuroscience do not scale well with the complexity of a learning and decision
making problem, namely on the order of complexity present in ecological
tasks. This is a well-studied problem in the machine learning literature,
known as the curse of dimensionality. Out of the solutions that have been
proposed to increase the scalability of RL mechanisms, one that is particu-
larly appealing to psychology and neuroscience is hierarchical reinforcement
learning (HRL). HRL exploits the task-subtask structure of sequential ac-
tion, which is a ubiquitous feature of human and animal behavior.
The present research pursued the hypothesis that the same neural struc-
tures that are involved in RL are also also involved in HRL. In particular,
that the activity of afferents of midbrain dopaminergic neurons should be
sensitive to prediction errors at the level of subtasks, termed pseudo-reward
prediction errors (PPEs). Before examining the neural correlates of PPEs,
a set of behavioral studies confirmed that humans do not attach reward to
subgoals, a crucial exploration to ensure that subgoal prediction errors are
not RPEs. Nevertheless, in accordance with HRL, subgoal-related prefer-
ences were manifest when participants were engaged in a subtask and when
their choices did not entail any change in reward. In three neuroimaging
studies, using fMRI and EEG, activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex
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(dACC) correlated with PPEs. Moreover, dACC responded to differences in
magnitude, but not valence, of the prediction errors. This is consistent with
a role of dACC in learning through surprising events. A final fMRI study
sought to compare the neural responses to PPEs to those of RPEs. Activity
in dACC for prediction errors was again shown to be unsigned. However,
responses were only observed for RPEs, and not PPEs. It is posited that
this dissociation was the result of competition between information at the
task and subtask level. This is compatible with the priority given to reward
over any reinforcing effect of subtasks, which was observed in the behavioral
studies. Across the reported studies, we observed no striatal engagement for
PPEs, or for RPEs at the level of subtasks, though we replicated responses
to monetary RPEs. The response of only a subset of dopaminergic afferents
for PPEs and the striatal dissociation between subtask and monetary RPEs
suggests that dopamine is not involved in hierarchical decision making.
In conclusion, this thesis encourages expansion of RL models in neu-
roscience to embrace mechanisms from HRL, and it advances the current
understanding of dACC function, positing an involvement in hierarchical
decision making.
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Chapter 1
Learning and Decision
Making in Hierarchical
Reinforcement Learning
1
1.1 Chapter Summary
This chapter lays out the fundamentals of Reinforcement Learning (RL)
and expounds the need to move beyond the algorithms usually employed in
the literature.1
• Temporal-difference RL has had a tremendous success in understand-
ing the neural foundations of decision making and learning.
• Computer scientists have pointed out that model-free RL does not
scale well with domain complexity. Psychologists and neuroscientists
have urged for more scalable, and thus more plausible, models.
• Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning (HRL) ameliorates the scalabil-
ity of model-free RL by introducing extended sequences of actions in
the behavioral repertoire of an agent.
• The computational concept of hierarchy resonates with longstanding
ideas in psychology and neuroscience.
• The neural correlates of model-free RL can be easily extended to yield
putative neural mechanisms for HRL.
1Sections of this chapter were published in Ribas-Fernandes, Niv, and Botvinick (2011).
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1.2 The Success of Model-free RL
Over the past two decades, ideas from computational reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) have had an important and growing effect on neuroscience and
psychology. The impact of RL was initially felt in research on classical and
instrumental conditioning (Barto & Sutton, 1981; Sutton & Barto, 1990;
Wickens, Kotter, & Houk, 1995). Soon thereafter, its reach extended to
research on midbrain dopaminergic function, where the temporal-difference
(TD) learning paradigm provided a framework for interpreting temporal
profiles of dopaminergic activity (Barto, 1995; Houk, Adams, & Barto, 1995;
Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996; Schultz, Dayan, & Montague, 1997;
Niv, 2009, for a review).
Subsequently, actor-critic architectures for RL have inspired new in-
terpretations of functional divisions of labor within the basal ganglia and
cerebral cortex (for a review, see Joel, Niv, & Ruppin, 2002), and RL-based
accounts have been advanced to address issues as diverse as motor control
(e.g., Miyamoto, Morimoto, Doya, & Kawato, 2004), working memory (e.g.,
O’Reilly & Frank, 2006), performance monitoring (e.g., Holroyd & Coles,
2002), and the distinction between habitual and goal-directed behavior (e.g.,
Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005).2 It has also advanced the understanding of cog-
nitive deficits in Parkinson’s disease, depression, ADHD and of personality
traits such as impulsivity (e.g., Frank & Seeberger, 2004; Maia & Frank,
2011, for a review).
2Curiously, ideas from neuroscience have in turn inspired algorithmic approaches in the
computational RL literature, namely the fact that phasic dopamine activity also reflects
novelty (Singh, Barto, & Chentanez, 2005; Reed, Mitchell, & Nokes, 1996; Dayan &
Balleine, 2002; Kakade & Dayan, 2002).
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1.3 Fundamentals of RL
RL problems comprise four elements: a set of world states, a set of actions
available to the agent in each state, a transition function, which specifies
the probability of transitioning from one state to another when performing
each action, and a reward function, which indicates the amount of reward
(or cost) associated with each such transition. Given these elements, the
objective of learning is to discover a policy, that is, a mapping from states
to actions, that maximizes cumulative discounted long-term reward.
There are a variety of specific algorithmic approaches to solving RL
problems (for reviews, see Bertsekas & Tsitsiklis, 1996; Sutton & Barto,
1998; Szepesvari, 2010). We focus on the approach that has arguably had
the most direct influence on neuroscientific translations of RL, referred to
as the actor-critic paradigm (Barto, 1995; Joel et al., 2002). In actor-critic
implementations of RL, the learning agent is divided into two parts, an ac-
tor and a critic, as illustrated in Figure 1.1A (for example, Barto, Sutton,
& Anderson, 1983; Houk et al., 1995; Suri, Bargas, & Arbib, 2001; Joel
et al., 2002). The actor selects actions according to a modifiable policy,
π(s) in Figure 1.1, which is based on a set of weighted associations from
states to actions, often called action strengths. The critic maintains a value
function, V (s), which associates each state with an estimate of the cumu-
lative, long-term reward that can be expected subsequent to visiting that
state. Importantly, both the action strengths and the value function must
be learned based on experience with the environment. At the outset of
learning, the value function and the actor’s action strengths are initialized,
for instance, uniformly or randomly, and the agent is placed in some initial
state. The actor then selects an action, following a rule that favors high-
strength actions but also allows for exploration. Once the resulting state
is reached and its associated reward is collected, the critic computes a TD
prediction error, denoted δ in Figure 1.1. The value that was attached to
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the previous state is treated as a prediction of the reward that would be
received in the successor state, R(s), plus the value attached to that succes-
sor state. A positive prediction error indicates that this prediction was too
low, meaning that an outcome turned out better than expected. Of course,
the reverse can also happen, yielding a negative prediction error.
The prediction error is used to update both the value attached to the
previous state and the strength of the action that was selected in that state.
A positive prediction error leads to an increase in the value of the previous
state and the propensity to perform the chosen action at that state. A neg-
ative error leads to a reduction in these. After the appropriate adjustments,
the agent selects a new action, a new state is reached, a new prediction error
is computed, and so forth. As the agent explores the environment and this
procedure is repeated, the critic’s value function becomes progressively more
accurate, and the actor’s action strengths change so as to yield progressive
improvements in behavior, in terms of the amount of reward obtained.
The actor-critic architecture, and the TD learning procedure it imple-
ments, have provided a very useful framework for decoding the neural sub-
strates of learning and decision making. Although accounts relating the
actor-critic architecture to neural structures do vary (for a review, see Joel
et al., 2002), one influential approach has been to identify the actor with the
dorsolateral striatum (DLS), and the critic with the ventral striatum (VS)
and the mesolimbic dopaminergic system (see, for instance, O’Doherty et
al., 2004; Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2006, Figure 1.1B). Dopamine (DA), in par-
ticular, has been associated with the function of conveying reward prediction
errors to both actor and critic (Barto, 1995; Montague et al., 1996; Schultz
et al., 1997). This set of correspondences will provide an important back-
drop for our later discussion of Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning (HRL)
and its neural correlates.
5
1.4 The Curse of Dimensionality and the Blessing
of Abstraction
The actor-critic framework, and other TD implementations, share the sim-
plicity of not keeping a model of the environment. This comprises the tran-
sition and reward functions. Such algorithms are therefore model-free, in
contrast to model-based RL, which explicitly learns and uses the transition
probabilities for computing values.
The simplicity of model-free RL comes at a cost. As the number of
states and actions increases, the time to reach an optimal policy increases
exponentially (Bellman, 1957), as a large amount of visitations to each
state-action pair is required to achieve a useful estimate of the value. This
is a well-known problem in the computational literature and impacts the
scalability of model-free RL. In spite of this problem, the testbeds of RL in
neuroscience and psychology have mostly been tasks with small complexity,
compared with the complexity of human behavior (Dayan & Niv, 2008;
Daw & Frank, 2009). The poor scalability thus questions the validity of RL
algorithms to human behavior.
Two computational concepts have been proposed to address the scaling
problem, abstraction and generalization (a division according to Ponsen,
Taylor, & Tuyls, 2010). In abstraction, the representation of the learn-
ing problem is changed to only include relevant properties to behavior. If
the change is applied to states it is called state or structural abstraction
(Li, Walsh, & Littman, 2006), and if it is employed in actions then it is
termed temporal abstraction (Precup, 2000). As opposed to an abstracted
representation, an unmodified representation is called flat. In contrast to
abstraction, in generalization the representation of a learning problem is not
changed. Instead, similarities between states or actions are leveraged.
These two ideas are combined into different sets of RL methods, 1. hier-
archical reinforcement learning (HRL, Barto & Mahadevan, 2003; Hengst,
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2012),using temporal, sometimes state, abstraction — whereby agents can
use actions at different levels of abstraction, 2. transfer learning (Taylor &
Stone, 2009), training on a source problem and applying knowledge to a tar-
get problem, using generalization, and 3. relational RL (Džeroski, De Raedt,
& Driessens, 2001), which uses inductive logic to represent actions and
states, and employs a mixture of abstraction and generalization.
The focus of this thesis is on HRL, where sequences of actions are rep-
resented according to a part-whole structure, illustrated in Figure 1.2. The
choice of abstraction in the action domain is sustained by the ample work in
psychology, pointing to a hierarchical structure of behavior and its neural
representations (see the section on hierarchy in behavior, and Botvinick,
2008).
Temporal abstraction has been around since early work in artificial in-
telligence (Newell & Simon, 1972; Fikes, Hart, & Nilsson, 1972). In its
inception, it involved using aggregated actions, called macro-operators to fa-
cilitate planning. Since then, work in AI focused on the representation of the
macro-operators, learning the sequence of actions of the macro-operators,
planning in stochastic environments, and finding useful subgoals, very much
the same questions that are approached by HRL (for a review, see Precup,
2000).
The use of these temporally-extended, aggregated actions allows systems
to solve problems in a smaller number of steps, as illustrated in Figure 1.3.
Assuming these sequences are known and are appropriate to the goal in
question, the problem of exploration becomes simpler. Many learning prob-
lems can be decomposed into smaller ones and it is often the case that
the composing units are shared with other tasks (Newell & Simon, 1972).
For instance, drive occurs both in get groceries and get to airport and it
would be inefficient to learn the same sequence twice. In any case, it is
important to ask about the origin and usefulness of these sequences (for
simulations of useful and prejudicial sequences, see Jong, Hester, & Stone,
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2008; Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009, and the section on subgoal discovery
in the last chapter).
1.5 Introduction to Hierarchical Reinforcement
Learning
HRL has two main objectives, reward maximization while learning policies
at several levels of abstraction, which this thesis focus on, and, to a lesser
extent, determine which levels of abstraction are relevant for behavior. For-
mally speaking, the HRL setting is no longer a Markov decision process
(MDP), but rather a semi-Markov decision process (SMDP), where depen-
dencies are no longer between single transitions, but rather span sequences
of states and actions, sometimes called histories.
Among HRL methods to learn policies hierarchically, the most popu-
lar are options (Sutton, Precup, & Singh, 1999), MAXQ (Dietterich, 1998)
and HAM (hierarchy of abstract machines by Parr, 1998; Parr & Russell,
1998). As defined in Diuk and Littman (2008), MAXQ is an algorithm
which receives a multi-level hierarchical task decomposition as an input,
something that can be both powerful and limiting, and incorporates state
abstraction at each level. HAM specifies a series of non-deterministic finite
state machines, where “elements in HAMs can be thought of as small pro-
grams, which at certain points can decide to make calls to other lower-level
programs” (Diuk & Littman, 2008). Both MAXQ and HAM can be ex-
pressed as options (Precup, 2000), and in general the options framework is
the most parsimonious and the one that requires least extensions from flat,
model-free RL (Sutton et al., 1999). For these reasons, Botvinick, Niv, and
Barto (2009) proposed the options framework as the first approximation to
understanding the neural correlates of reward-based hierarchical learning.
Other HRL methods differ from options, MAXQ or HAM in that they
use state abstraction (Dayan & Hinton, 1993, though MAXQ also uses state
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abstraction), target problems with partial observability (Wiering & Schmid-
huber, 1998), address continuous-time MDPs (Ghavamzadeh & Mahadevan,
2001) or solve concurrent activities (Rohanimanesh & Mahadevan, 2001).
1.5.1 Options
In options the action space is extended to include temporally extended
actions, called options,3 illustrated in Figure 1.4, in addition to regular,
primitive, actions. This parses the core MDP into smaller MDPs, each
being a separate learning problem, with its own reward function (in terms
of pseudo-reward). Regardless of the structure of the action space, the
observable output of behavior is a sequence of primitive actions. In reality,
primitive actions can be considered one-step options. However, for clarity,
we will continue to refer to primitive actions as actions. In options, the state
space in options is the same as the core MDP, at all levels of the hierarchy
(differing from, for example, Dayan & Hinton, 1993).4
Options are characterized by three components: (1) a set of initiation
states, determining at which states an option is available for selection, (2)
a set of termination conditions, mapping states to a probability of termina-
tion, and (3) option-specific policies πo. Option-specific policies can invoke
primitive actions, or other options.
Top-level action selection and learning. Whether to select an op-
tion at a particular state is governed by values which reflect expected dis-
counted sum of rewards, V (s), similarly to selection of actions in regular
RL, Figure 1.5. In options, however, V (s) reflects the extended nature of
3We will use italic to denote the framework and regular type for the extended actions.
4The term “option” exists in other fields of psychology (Kalis, Kaiser, & Mojzisch,
2013), as a statement that is relevant to the attainment of a goal, not necessarily in the
domain of actions (Ward, 2007), in the problem-solving literature as possible steps that
can be taken for the attainment of an action (Klein, Wolf, Militello, & Zsambok, 1995),
and in the context of motor decisions in sport, where an option is almost on the opposite
end of temporal abstraction, describing sets of motor primitives such joint angles (Raab
& Johnson, 2007).
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the option:
V π(s) = E{rt+1 + ...+ γk−1rt+k + γkV π(st+k)|o, s, t} (1.1)
Where k is the duration of option o, taken at state st, according to policy π,
terminated in state st+k and discounted by γ. Notice that the value reflects
option policies, as it is a sum of the yields during option o: E{rt+1 +
... + γk−1rt+k}, with the value at the termination state V π(st+k). This is
illustrated in Figure 1.5.
Learning at the reward level is very similar to flat RL, and consists of
regular and extended updates. Taking as an example the MDP shown in
Figure 1.5, the first prediction error (the green arrow between s1 and s2) is
equal between the hierarchical (top) and flat (bottom) agents, because in
both cases a primitive action was selected:
V (s1)← V (s1) + δ, δ = α[r2 + γV (s2)− V (s1)] (1.2)
Where α is the learning rate. In s2, however, the update will be different.
V (s2) is updated with extended reward prediction errors (the long green
arrow in 1.5):
V (s2)← V (s2) + δ, δ = α[r3 + γr4 + ...+ γkV (s5)− V (s2)] (1.3)
This update happens after the option has been terminated, s5 and the agent
has observed the entire sequence of accrued rewards. The next time an agent
is in s2, V (s2), which reflects an encapsulated prediction of rewards, will be
used to select actions as flat values in regular RL (e.g., using softmax).
Option-level action selection and learning. Once an option is se-
lected, option-specific values come into play (Vo). These only affect action
selection while the agent is executing the option. Values V reflect expected
discounted cumulative reward, whereas Vo reflects expected discounted cu-
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mulative pseudo-reward (depicted with a yellow asterisk in Figure 1.6). This
is a hedonic signal that is delivered at the last state of the option, called
the subgoal, and used to drive learning of option policies, independently of
the top level. This way the agent learns option policies, that can be later
transferred across problems with similar task structure, as well as root-level
policies. It is paramount that this is separate from reward, otherwise an
agent would prematurely terminate its behavioral course at the subgoal.
Learning while an option is executed also resorts to TD learning. At
the end of each action, the learning agent observes a certain amount of
pseudo-reward and the option-specific value of the new state, and with this
information a pseudo-reward prediction error is computed:
Vo(st)← Vo(st) + δ, δ = α[ψrt+1 + γVo(st+1)− Vo(st)] (1.4)
Where ψr designs the amount of pseudo-reward, and δ is the pseudo-reward
prediction error, or PPE (depicted by the lower green arrows in Figure 1.6).
Crucially these updates and quantities are independent of the top level, and
do not exist in standard RL methods.
Options bears the most resemblance with the methods that have been
tested in neuroscience (e.g., O’Doherty, Dayan, Friston, Critchley, & Dolan,
2003). For this reason, we adopt the framework of Botvinick, Niv, and
Barto (2009), who have proposed options as the parsimonious candidate for
extending neural RL mechanisms to hierarchical domains.
1.6 Hierarchy in Action and its Neural Implemen-
tation
The aim of this section is to review evidence for a hierarchical organization
behavior and its neural bases, and thus provide a scaffold for neural HRL.
There are important arguments to keep in mind while discussing evidence of
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hierarchy. There is no clear behavioral hallmark of hierarchy, unlike deval-
uation for goal-directed behavior (Dickinson, 1985). Only when cognitive
paradigms became more refined was it possible to detect hierarchical struc-
ture in behavior (for example, Rosenbaum, Kenny, & Derr, 1983; Crump
& Logan, 2010; Collins & Frank, 2013), looking at patterns of transfer,
priming and switch costs. Secondly, any task with hierarchical structure
can be solved by a flat agent, without abstract actions or abstract repre-
sentations (Sutton et al., 1999; Botvinick & Plaut, 2004). Finally, there is
a utility problem in adding temporally-extended sequences to control. This
was recognized by early AI (Lehman, Laird, & Rosenbloom, 1996), and only
recently has it received systematic attention (Jong et al., 2008; Van Dijk,
Polani, & Nehaniv, 2011; Solway et al., submitted). In spite of hierarchy
being historically difficult to detect, not strictly necessary, and sometimes
prejudicial to learning, hierarchical behavior is ubiquitous, as we review
below.
1.6.1 Hierarchical structure in behavior
Karl Lashley (1951) is credited with first pointing out the need for a non-
sequential account of behavior. He argued that selecting an action at every
behavioral transition was inefficient — thus coming closer to the computa-
tional justification for hierarchy, as presented in section 1.4. He supported
this idea with the pattern of errors in language, which showed evidence of
higher-level mental plans, instead of being the product of single stimulus-
response associations. For example, when typing groceries, errors will often
reflect a forthcoming letter or subsequence, grocreis, rather than a random
letter, grockeis. From a computational perspective, this example suggests
that errors depend on extended policies, very much like an option (though
the options framework does not make a direct prediction about errors). Be-
cause of this earlier reliance on language, it took 40 years until a similar
statement was published in the animal literature (Terrace, 1993; Fountain,
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Wallace, & Rowan, 2002, though research on goal-directed action already
mitigated a stimulus-response account of behavior).
After Lashley’s argument, early work in cognitive psychology focused
on how such hierarchical behavior could be generated, from a cognitive per-
spective and by mapping abstract modules of action directly to a control
unit. A pioneering model in this regard was the TOTE model of Miller,
Galanter, and Pribram (1960, Test-Operate-Test-Execute), where each unit
resembled a finite-state machine as in HAM. As cited in Botvinick (2008),
this was followed by research on scheduling of control units (in memory,
Estes, 1972; typing and speech, Rumelhart & Norman, 1982; Mackay, 1987;
and in the domain of everyday action, Cooper & Shallice, 2000), on the
combination of habitual and supervisory units (Norman & Shallice, 1986),
on models with biologically inspired units (Dehaene & Changeux, 1997;
Grossberg, 1986; Houghton, 1990), and on more abstract proposals of hi-
erarchical structure in action performance and understanding (Schank &
Abelson, 1977). Beyond providing a generative model for hierarchical be-
havior, these models also gave support to Lashley’s suggestion that errors
are a result of higher-level plans (e.g., Cooper & Shallice, 2000).
An important change of paradigm was introduced by connectionist mod-
els (Elman, 1990; Cleeremans, 1993; and later followed by Botvinick &
Plaut, 2004; Botvinick, 2007; Frank & Badre, 2012). Contrary to prior
models, hierarchical representations were not explicitly built in the model.
Rather, these were represented in the patterns of weights between hidden
units, and arose through learning, without input from the user. The fact
that behavior can be achieved through very different representations high-
lights the important possibility that the task structure might not be mir-
rored in the actual neural implementation (Uithol, van Rooij, Bekkering, &
Haselager, 2012).
Early on, evidence for hierarchical structure in behavior were thorough
registrations of slips of action, in line with Lashley’s language examples,
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drawing from research on verbal behavior (Garnham, Shillcock, Brown, Mill,
& Cutler, 1981), and routine actions, normal and pathological (Reason,
1979; Schwartz, Reed, Montgomery, Palmer, & Mayer, 1991; Humphreys
& Forde, 1998). Later, springing from a renewed focus on hierarchical be-
havior, other sources of research provided evidence to hierarchy in behavior:
research on event perception (Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Kurby & Zacks, 2008)
— showing how people can parse streams of actions into meaningful subse-
quences; typing (Logan, 2011) — showing priming and Stroop-like effects
at different levels of abstraction; and developmental psychology (Saffran &
Wilson, 2003; Whiten, Flynn, Brown, & Lee, 2006) — showing how infants
learn simultaneously at different levels of abstraction. Direct behavioral ev-
idence for human learning at several timescales according to RL principles
comes from recent neuroimaging studies (Haruno & Kawato, 2006; Diuk,
Tsai, Wallis, Botvinick, & Niv, 2013).
In the animal literature, evidence came from chunking of action se-
quences and analysis of grooming sequences in rodents (Fentress, 1972;
Berridge, Fentress, & Parr, 1987, in a similar vein to the earlier descrip-
tive analyses, e.g., Reason, 1979) — which demonstrates the existence of
temporally extended policies; and list learning (Terrace, 1993), in pigeons
and monkeys — eliciting similar errors to Lashley’s misinsertions (for a
review, see Conway & Christiansen, 2001).
Even though state abstraction is not part of many HRL methods, we
should mention studies that involve this type of abstraction. This is based
on the fact that the two abstractions might share many of the prefrontal
substrates, as discussed in the next section, and that, from an ecological
perspective, state and temporal abstraction often co-occur. In this setting,
research on task sets comes to bearing (MacLeod, 1991; Monsell, 2003),
showing that people learn abstract rules, and that errors and priming ef-
fects are dependent on which abstract rule is control of behavior — though
research in this field has mostly concentrated on the dynamics of task switch-
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ing. Particularly relevant are studies that show abstraction even in settings
where it is not necessary to do so (Badre, Kayser, & D Esposito, 2010;
Frank & Badre, 2012; Collins & Frank, 2013, the later two studies combin-
ing neuroimaging and behavior). SimiIarly to effects of task sets in humans,
context effects in conditioning in rodents show that single actions depend
on more abstract states (Courville, Daw, & Touretzky, 2006; Gershman &
Niv, 2012).
1.6.2 Neural implementation of hierarchical sequential ac-
tion
The structures that have figured in action selection and performance in hi-
erarchical domains have been the dorsolateral prefrontal and orbitofrontal
cortices (DLPFC and OFC), dorsolateral striatum (DLS), and to a lesser
extent, the ventral striatum (VS).5 For the reason that theoretical under-
standing and empirical evidence are still growing, rather than adopting a
specific framework to describe the activity of these areas, we review ways
in which neural responses differ from a flat representation. Only in the
next section do we discuss how these areas can be associated with a neural
instantiation of options.
The more straightforward and earliest forms of implementation of task
hierarchies assumed that the action hierarchy was mirrored in the control
hierarchy, where each unit reflected a subtask which would be sequentially
activated, as in Figure 1.7A (e.g., Miller et al., 1960; Cooper & Shallice,
2000). However, even though neuroanatomical hierarchical divisions might
be obvious (e.g., Goldman-Rakic, 1987), representations might not con-
tain any direct elements of the action hierarchy (Botvinick & Plaut, 2004;
Botvinick, 2007; Reynolds & Mozer, 2009; Uithol et al., 2012), as proved
by connectionist models. The exact same behavior can be produced with-
5One source of research that we do not mention is literature on perception of goals,
which involves the inferior parietal sulcus (Hamilton & Grafton, 2006; Bonini et al., 2011).
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out any explicit division of labor (Figure 1.7B, Botvinick & Plaut, 2004; or
Koechlin, Ody, & Kouneiher, 2003, vs. Reynolds & Mozer, 2009), and even
if there is a hierarchical separation between units, each might not map onto
particular subactions (Botvinick, 2007). To add to the confusion, hierar-
chical divisions of labor might be beneficial even for non-hierarchical tasks
(Botvinick, 2007).
Prefrontal cortex. Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC, BA 9,
and 46) has been extensively studied in humans and nonhuman primates,
in lesion and normal studies. A single pattern of DLPFC activation has
been associated with an entire mapping from stimuli to responses (Hoshi,
Shima, & Tanji, 1998; White & Wise, 1999; Asaad, Rainer, & Miller, 2000;
Shimamura, 2000; Wallis, Anderson, & Miller, 2001; Bunge, 2004; Rougier,
Noell, Braver, Cohen, & O’Reilly, 2005; Johnston & Everling, 2006), and
not the details of the task itself, corroborating the guided activation theory
(Miller & Cohen, 2001). DLPFC has also been found to code for progression
in a multistep task (Hasegawa, Blitz, & Goldberg, 2004; Knutson, Wood, &
Grafman, 2004; Amiez & Petrides, 2007; Berdyyeva & Olson, 2010; Saga,
Iba, Tanji, & Hoshi, 2011) and action sequence boundaries (Fujii & Graybiel,
2003; Farooqui, Mitchell, Thompson, & Duncan, 2012), a type of response
that has also been found in dorsolateral striatum.
The function of DLPFC is often considered together with that of fron-
topolar cortex (BA 10) and anterior premotor cortex (BA 8) in a number
of theories which posit a rostrocaudal allocation of function. Each theory
focus on a particular variable: amount of information required to reduce re-
sponse uncertainty (Koechlin & Summerfield, 2007), level of state abstrac-
tion (Badre & D’Esposito, 2007; Badre, Hoffman, Cooney, & D’Esposito,
2009), temporal abstraction (Sirigu et al., 1995; Fuster, 1997; Grafman,
2002; Wood & Grafman, 2003, 2003; Zalla, Pradat-Diehl, & Sirigu, 2003),
relational complexity (Christoff, 2003; Christoff & Keramatian, 2007), or
domain specificity (Sakai & Passingham, 2006; Courtney, Roth, & Sala,
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2007) — for reviews, see Hoshi (2006), Botvinick (2008), Badre (2008), and
Badre and D’Esposito (2009). The exact contribution of each area and the
nature of the gradient is still a subject of controversy (Reynolds, O’Reilly,
Cohen, & Braver, 2012; Duncan, 2013).
One possible source of confusion for theories of lateral prefrontal cortex,
is that abstract actions are often associated with multiple effectors, as well
as abstract, multimodal states. In addition, different cognitive processes
might be recruited for each level of abstraction (e.g., temporally abstract
actions require working memory, whereas primitive actions do not), making
it that the organizing principle might not be about levels of hierarchy, but
cognitive processes.
Neurophysiological data has shown that within OFC (BA 11, 13, and 14)
reward-predictive activity tends to be sustained, spanning temporally ex-
tended segments of task structure (Schultz, Tremblay, & Hollerman, 2000).
In addition, the response of OFC neurons to the receipt of primary rewards
has been shown to vary depending on the wait-time leading up to the reward
(Roesch, Taylor, & Schoenbaum, 2006).
Another prefrontal area that has been involved in hierarchical behavior
is the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA, BA 8). In addition to the
putative role at the lower levels of hierarchy as stipulated by rostro-caudal
gradient theories, this area has been found to code for sequences of move-
ment as a whole (Shima, Mushiake, Saito, & Tanji, 1996; Nakamura, Sakai,
& Hikosaka, 1998; Shima & Tanji, 2000; Bor, Duncan, Wiseman, & Owen,
2003; Kennerley, Sakai, & Rushworth, 2004; Averbeck & Lee, 2007; Shima,
Isoda, Mushiake, & Tanji, 2007), and task set identity (Rushworth, Walton,
Kennerley, & Bannerman, 2004).
Striatum. The dorsolateral striatum (DLS) has been shown to respond
to the serial order of action in a sequence, but not of the action in isola-
tion (in rodents, Aldridge, Berridge, Herman, & Zimmer, 1993; Aldridge &
Berridge, 1998; Cromwell & Berridge, 1996; non-human primates, Kermadi,
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Jurquet, Arzi, & Joseph, 1993; Kermadi & Joseph, 1995; Mushiake & Strick,
1995; Ravel, Sardo, Legallet, & Apicella, 2006). In addition, DLS has been
shown to respond to the start and beginning of a sequence, something known
as task bracketing (evidence coming mostly from rodents Jin & Costa, 2010;
Barnes et al., 2011). This phenomenon might have a role in sequence chunk-
ing (Graybiel, 1998; Burkhardt, Jin, & Costa, 2009), such that lesions of
DLS lead to impairments in building extended behavioral repertoires (Boyd
et al., 2009; Tremblay et al., 2010). In addition, it is noteworthy that
DLPFC projects heavily onto DLS (Alexander, DeLong, & Strick, 1986;
Parent & Hazrati, 1995), thus consolidating the idea that these two struc-
tures are involved in sequential learning and selection — directly compared
in Fujii and Graybiel (2005). These connections have supported the detailed
computational models of Frank and Claus, which show how frontal inputs
to the striatum could switch among different stimulus-response pathways
(Rougier et al., 2005; Frank & Claus, 2006; O’Reilly & Frank, 2006).
Ventral striatum (VS) has figured less in hierarchical representation of
behavior. Instead, it has been proposed to be involved in learning at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction (Ito & Doya, 2011). Consistent with a role in
learning at multiple levels, a recent study has shown that ventral striatal
codes for prediction errors at multiple levels of abstraction (Diuk et al.,
2013) — at one level associated with deviations of outcomes from a ban-
dit task, and at a higher level, deviations from outcomes of a sequence of
bandits.
Finally, outside PFC and striatum, Daw, Courville, and Touretzky
(2003) have suggested that DA responses are driven by representations
which divide event sequences into temporally-extended segments, based on
the pattern of responses to delayed rewards.
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1.7 Extending Neural RL Mechanisms to HRL
HRL requires several computational extensions to regular RL: (1) Extended
PEs, (2) Extended values, (3) Option-specific policies, (4) Option-specific
value functions and pseudo-reward, and (5) Option-specific PEs or pseudo-
reward prediction errors (PPEs). Botvinick, Niv, and Barto (2009) have
proposed a mapping between these extensions and particular neural struc-
tures.
Other relevant, though less general, neural implementations of HRL have
been put forth by Ito & Doya (2011) and Frank & Badre (2012) — see the
last chapter for discussion of the differences between approaches. These have
focused on cortico-striatal loops. Ito & Doya has proposed that higher levels
of abstraction are represented more rostrally and medially in the basal gan-
glia, and more rostrally in the prefrontal cortex. Frank & Badre simulated
and tested an extension of the working memory model of prefrontal-basal
interactions for state abstraction (O’Reilly & Frank, 2006). Another im-
plementation of HRL, Holroyd and Yeung (2012), has given a key role in
option selection and maintenance to the medial frontal cortex, and to the
interaction with dorsolateral and orbital frontal cortices.
1.7.1 Extended PEs
One important change in how PEs are computed is that HRL widens the
scope of the events that the prediction error addresses. In standard RL,
the prediction error indicates whether outcomes went better or worse than
expected since the immediately preceding single-step action. In contrast,
the prediction errors associated with options are framed around temporally
extended events.
The widened scope of the prediction error computation in HRL resonates
with work on midbrain DA function. In articulating this account, Daw et
al. (2003) provided a formal analysis of DA function that draws on precisely
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the same principles of temporal abstraction that also provide the foundation
for HRL, namely an SMDP framework. Consistent with the involvement of
dopamine in computing extended PEs, Diuk et al. showed ventral striatal
responses to extended PEs, in addition to regular PEs.
1.7.2 Extended values
Note that in HRL, in order to compute a prediction error when an option
terminates, certain information is needed. In particular, the critic needs ac-
cess to the reward prediction it made when the option was initially selected,
and for purposes of temporal discounting it also needs to know how much
time has passed since that prediction was made. These requirements of
HRL resonate with data concerning the OFC (Schultz et al., 2000; Roesch
et al., 2006), which have shown that reward-predictive activity is sensitive
to task structure.
1.7.3 Option-specific policies
As mentioned above, options come with their own policies, πo in Figure 1.1C,
assembled from a behavioral repertoire of actions and other options. This
consists of two key variables: a representation of the identity of the op-
tion currently in control of behavior, and the sequence that is about to be
performed, an option-level policy.
From a neuroscientific point of view, the representation of option iden-
tities seems very closely related to that commonly ascribed to the DLPFC.
Prefrontal representations are not thought to implement policies directly,
but instead select among stimulus-response pathways implemented outside
the prefrontal cortex (Miller & Cohen, 2001). This division of labor fits
well with the distinction in HRL between an option’s identifier and the pol-
icy with which it is associated, which might be mapped onto DLPFC and
preSMA/DLS respectively.
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Research on frontal cortex also accords well with the stipulation in HRL
that temporally abstract actions may organize into hierarchies, with the
policy for one option (say, an option for making coffee) calling other, lower-
level options (say, options for adding sugar or cream). This fits with the
accounts suggesting that the frontal cortex serves to represent action at
multiple, nested levels of temporal structure (Sirigu et al., 1995; Fuster,
1997; Grafman, 2002; Wood & Grafman, 2003, 2003; Zalla et al., 2003),
possibly in such a way that higher levels of structure are represented more
anteriorly (Botvinick, 2008; Badre, 2008; Badre & D’Esposito, 2009).
As reviewed earlier, neuroscientific interpretations of the basic actor-
critic architecture generally place policy representations within the DLS. It
is thus relevant that such regions as the DLPFC, SMA, pre-SMA and PMC
— areas potentially representing options — all project heavily to the DLS
(Alexander et al., 1986; Parent & Hazrati, 1995).
In HRL, as in guided activation theory, temporally abstract action rep-
resentations in frontal cortex select among alternative (i.e., option-specific)
policies. In order to support option-specific policies, the DLS would need
to integrate information about the currently controlling option with infor-
mation about the current environmental state, as is indicated by the arrows
converging on the policy module in Figure 1.1.
Unlike the selection of primitive actions, the selection of options in HRL
involves initiation, maintenance and termination phases. At the neural level,
the maintenance phase would be naturally supported within DLPFC, which
has been extensively implicated in working memory function (Postle, 2006;
Courtney et al., 2007; D’Esposito, 2007). With regard to initiation and ter-
mination, it is intriguing that phasic activity has been observed, both within
the DLS and in several areas of frontal cortex, at the boundaries of tempo-
rally extended action sequences (Zacks et al., 2001; Fujii & Graybiel, 2003;
Morris, Arkadir, Nevet, Vaadia, & Bergman, 2004). Since these bound-
aries correspond to points where new options would be selected, boundary-
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aligned activity in the DLS and frontal cortex is also consistent with a pro-
posed role of the DLS in gating information into prefrontal working memory
circuits (Rougier et al., 2005; O’Reilly & Frank, 2006).
1.7.4 Option-specific value functions and pseudo-reward
Another difference between HRL and ordinary TD learning is that learning
in HRL occur at all levels of task structure. This is because, as mentioned in
the section on HRL, there is a separate reward signal, noted pseudo-reward.
The possible neural correlates for pseudo-reward are the structures that
are posited to carry reward signals (Wise, 2002), the hypothalamus, and
the pedunculopontine nucleus. The hypothetical neural correlate of such
encapsulated value function would be the OFC (as reviewed in the section
on extended value functions).
1.7.5 Option-specific PEs or pseudo-reward prediction er-
rors (PPE)
At the topmost or root level, prediction errors signal unanticipated changes
in the prospects for primary reward. However, in addition, once the HRL
agent enters a subroutine, separate prediction error signals indicate the
degree to which each action has carried the agent toward the currently rele-
vant subgoal and its associated pseudo-reward. Note that these subroutine-
specific prediction errors are unique to HRL.
In what follows, we refer to them as pseudo-reward prediction errors
(PPE), reserving reward prediction error (RPE) for prediction errors relat-
ing to reward. Because the PPE is not found in ordinary RL, it can be
considered a functional signature of HRL. If the neural mechanisms under-
lying hierarchical behavior are related to those found in HRL, it should be
possible to uncover a neural correlate of the PPE. On grounds of parsi-
mony, one would expect to find PPE signals in the same structures that
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have been shown to carry RPE-related signals, in particular targets of mid-
brain dopaminergic projections including VS (Pagnoni, Zink, Montague, &
Berns, 2002; O’Doherty et al., 2004; Hare, O’Doherty, Camerer, Schultz, &
Rangel, 2008), anterior cingulate cortex (Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd,
Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, & Cohen, 2003), as well as the habenula (Ullsperger
& von Cramon, 2003; Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2007; Salas & Montague,
2010) and amygdala (Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 2001;
Yacubian et al., 2006).
1.8 Aims: Exploring Neural Correlates of PPEs
The present work has focused on evidence for subtask-bounded prediction
errors or pseudo-reward prediction errors (PPEs). The aims of the thesis
are to:
• Develop a hierarchical paradigm where PPEs can be safely dissociated
from RPEs (chapter Decision making in subtasks).
• Assess the influence of pseudo-reward on behavior (chapter Decision
making in subtasks).
• Explore the neural correlates of positive and negative PPEs separately
(chapter Neural correlates of pseudo-reward prediction errors).
• In a single paradigm, compare neural responses to PPEs and RPEs
(chapter Neural correlates of pseudo-reward and reward prediction
errors).
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Figure 1.1. Fundamentals of the actor-critic architecture. (A) Relationship
between agent and environment (π(s) - policy, V (s) - value at state s, R(s)
- reward at state s, δ - reward prediction error). Arrows represent direction
of computations. (B) Neural correlates of actor-critic (DLS - dorsolateral
striatum, DA - midbrain dopamine, VS ventral striatum, HT+ - hypotha-
lamus and related reward structures, e.g., peduncunlopontine nucleus). (C)
Extensions of actor-critic for options (o - option identifier, πo(s) - policy,
Vo(s) - option-specific value function, R(s) - reward function, δ - pseudo-
reward prediction error). (D) Putative neural extensions of the actor-critic
architecture for options (DLPFC - dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, OFC -
orbitofrontal cortex). From Botvinick, Niv, and Barto (2009).
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superordinate actions
make a cup of tea
basic actions
subordinate actions
put teabag
in teapot
pour hot water
in teapot
put milk
in cup
pour milk
into cup
put sugar
in cup
stir tea
lift teapot move teapot 
to cup
tilt teapot
until tea pours
Figure 1.2. Hierarchical decomposition of the task of making tea. From
Botvinick (2007), adapted from Humphreys and Forde (1998).
Figure 1.3. Temporal abstraction ameliorating the scalability of RL. In this
Markov decision problem (MDP) an agent has to perform six sequential
binary decisions. Only one of the branches yields reward. The flat agent
(A), which uses only primitive actions, has to make six decisions. Assuming
the agent has previously learned the red and blue sequences of actions (B),
then exploration is greatly facilitated (C). This beneficial effect assumes
that these sequences are already learned and appropriate for the domain
in question — see the section on subgoal discovery for a discussion of this
issue. From Botvinick, Niv, and Barto (2009).
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Figure 1.4. Behavioral repertoire of an options agent. Each grey box repre-
sents a state. The state at t = 6 yields reward, marked by the red asterisk.
a denotes primitive actions and o, an option. The final sequence of behavior
is the sequence of primitive actions a1-5. Adapted from Botvinick, Niv, and
Barto (2009).
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Figure 1.5. Reward-driven updates in HRL (top) and RL (bottom). Green
arrows represent prediction errors. Reward-driven prediction errors in HRL
can be exactly the same as in flat RL, as between s1 and s2, or reflect the
extended nature of options illustrated in the long arrow between s2 and
s5. Both values reflect an expected sum of discounted reward (marked by
the asterisk), though with different temporal structure — see main text.
Adapted from Botvinick, Niv, and Barto (2009).
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Figure 1.6. All learning updates in HRL and flat RL. In addition to learning
values driven by reward, an HRL agent learns simultaneously at the subtask
level. This is driven by pseudo-reward, and involves reward-independent
updates called pseudo-reward prediction errors (PPE, represented by the
lower-facing green arrows). PPEs are then used to update option-specific
values Vo. Adapted from Botvinick, Niv, and Barto (2009).
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Coffee
Prepare Instant Coffee
Add Sugar
From Packet
Add Sugar
From Bowl
Add Milk
From Carton
Add Coffee
From Jar
Add Coffee
From Packet
Sugar into Coffee Milk into Coffee Grinds into Coffee
Hold Discard Open Close Transfer Dip Spoon Empty Spoon
Pick Up Put Down Tear Unscrew Screw Pour Dip Spoon Empty Spoon
Perceptual
input
Internal
Representation
Actions
Environment
fixated
object
held
object
Figure 1.7. Comparison of symbolic and connectionist models of routine se-
quential action. (A) In the symbolic model of Cooper and Shallice (2000),
the generative model of routine actions was composed of units which mir-
rored the parcellation of the task. (B) In the connectionist approach,
Botvinick and Plaut (2004) modeled the same task with a recurrent neural
network, without an explicit division of labor between units in the internal
representation. The comparable parts of the two models are highlighted by
the dashed lines.
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Chapter 2
Decision Making in Subtasks
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2.1 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we describe a series of experiments that examine behavioral
predictions of HRL.
• A first experiment aimed at testing the relative influence of goals and
subgoals on choice behavior. We designed a hierarchical spatial nav-
igation paradigm where participants had to navigate a truck to pick
up an envelope and then deliver it to a house. In this task, there was
a clear incentive at minimizing the distance traveled. We offered two
envelopes, trading-off action costs to attain the subgoal with those of
the goal. Participants showed clear avoidance of goal costs and were
indifferent to subgoal costs.
• A second and third experiment were variants of the hierarchical task,
used to test predictions of HRL. The predictions are that subgoal
preferences should be manifest when a participant is executing an op-
tion and that, the effect of such preferences should be larger when a
choice is offered between subgoals of equal costs of goal attainment.
There was a strong influence of goal preferences, as in the first ex-
periment. Surprisingly, the choice patterns showed no influence of
subgoals, suggesting that participants might have terminated the op-
tion “get subgoal” at the moment of choice (assuming a hierarchical
representation).
• On a fourth experiment, we refined the previous paradigms using a
minimal amount of pause, and voluntary, instead of forced, choice, in-
tending to cause the least amount of disruption to option maintenance.
We observed a clear influence of distance to subgoal in participants’
preferences. This was distributed on a spectrum of preferences: ap-
proximately one third of the participants minimized the costs in the
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first subtask, another third minimized the subgoal costs for a second
subtask, and the remaining third was indifferent.
• The behavioral findings obtained appear consistent with primary pre-
dictions from HRL, in spite of an unexpected pattern of choices.
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2.2 A Task Paradigm for Studying Hierarchical
Decision Making
The behavioral experiments described in this chapter aim at tapping into
HRL-like decision-making mechanisms.1 This means that preferences
should reflect the influence of reward, as is the case with flat agent, and,
under certain conditions, reflect the influence of pseudo-reward, at the level
of subgoals. When there is a trade off between reward and pseudo-reward,
the former should completely dominate the latter. This is because there
should be no attachment of reward to a subgoal (which would be a variant
of a flat agent). This first experiment examines the prediction of goal
dominance. Nevertheless, as stipulated by HRL, subgoal preferences should
be revealed when there is no trade off between reward and pseudo-reward,
or the subject is executing an option — something we explore in the
ensuing experiments. There have been early behavioral studies in rodents
examining the very same questions we pose here (Gilhousen, 1940; Spence
& Grice, 1942; Kendler, 1943). In these studies, it is found that rats prefer
closer subgoals independently of overall distance. However, upon closer
inspection, the manipulation of subgoal distance also implied a change
in goal distance. To our knowledge, there is no work addressing these
questions of hierarchical preferences.
We designed a hierarchical paradigm based on a benchmark task from
the computational HRL literature (the taxi task, Dietterich, 1998), the
courier task. Participants played a video game which is illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.1. As detailed below, in spatial paradigms the distances to the goal
and subgoal can be independently manipulated, which will prove crucial to
determine whether people attach reward to the subgoal. Only the colored
elements in the figure appeared in the task display. The overall objective of
1This experiment has been published in Ribas-Fernandes, Solway, et al. (2011), and
some of the text and figures are adapted from this source.
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the game was to complete a delivery as quickly as possible, using joystick
movements to guide the truck first to the package and from there to the
house. It is self-evident how this task might be represented hierarchically,
with delivery serving as the externally rewarded, top-level goal and acqui-
sition of the package as an obvious subgoal. This observation is not meant
to suggest that the task must be represented hierarchically. Indeed, it is an
established point in the HRL literature that any hierarchical policy has an
equivalent non-hierarchical or flat policy, as long as the underlying decision
problem satisfies the Markov property. For an HRL agent, delivery would be
associated with primary reward and acquisition of the package with pseudo-
reward. However, as mentioned in the introduction, pseudo-reward does not
trade off with reward at the top level. For an RL agent, only delivery would
be associated with reward, unless an agent attached reward to both pick-
up and delivery of the package, which would show independent approach
behavior.
Figure 2.1. Hierarchical spatial paradigm. Participants had to pick up the
package and deliver it to the house, using a joystick. Elements in the figure
are not to scale.
Let us examine how action costs to the subgoal can be dissociated from
those to the goal. Consider the envelope shown in Figure 2.2A. Any point
on the solid line will have the same distance d1 to the truck as the reference
envelope. In Figure 2.2B, any point on the ellipse, the dashed line, will
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have the same distance to the house, d1 + d2, shown by point P, but a
different distance to the subgoal. Assuming action costs are proportional to
the distance, we can then offer choices with independent subgoal and goal
costs, and observe participants’ preferences.2
A B
d1 d1
d2
P
d4
d3
d1 + d2 = d3 + d4
Figure 2.2. Dissociating action costs to attain the subgoal and the goal.
(A) Costs to the subgoal. Any point of the solid circle will have the same
action costs as the shown subgoal. (B) Costs to the goal. The costs to the
goal are d1 +d2. By definition, any point on the dashed ellipse has the same
costs to attain the goal as the envelope on the right (e.g., point P).
Methods
Participants. A total of 22 participants were recruited from the Princeton
University community (M = 20.3, SD = .5, 11 male). All provided informed
consent and received a nominal payment.
Task and procedure. Participants sat at a comfortable distance from
a computer display in a closed room. A joystick was held in the right hand
2The “birds-eye” view of the display affords information about future states, which is
different from the first-person perspective of a model-free agent in a gridworld. However,
we wanted to make sure that both goal and subgoal distances were available to the partic-
ipants at all times. Otherwise any manipulation of subgoal distance would be confounded
with incomplete information about overall distance. In addition, as described in the next
chapters, the manipulations eliciting prediction errors had elements of unpredictability
which are independent of the agent’s model of the task.
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(Logitech International, Romanel-sur-Morges, Switzerland). The computer-
ized task was coded using MATLAB (The MathWorks) and the MATLAB
Psychophysics Toolbox, version 3 (Brainard, 1997). On each trial, three
display elements appeared: a truck, an envelope and a house (Figure 2.1).
Each joystick movement displaced the truck a fixed distance of 50 pixels.
The orientation of the truck was randomly chosen after every such trans-
lation, and participants were required to tailor their joystick responses to
the truck’s orientation, as if they were facing its steering wheel (Figure 2.3).
For example if the front of the truck were oriented toward the bottom of
the screen, a rightward movement of the joystick would move the truck to
the left. This aspect of the task was intended to ensure that intensive spa-
tial processing occurred at each step of the task, rather than only at the
beginning of a trial. Responses were registered when the joystick was tilted
beyond half its maximum displacement (Figure 2.3A). Between responses
the participant was required to restore the joystick to a central position
(Figures 2.3A).
The experiment was composed of three phases. In the first phase, partic-
ipants completed ten deliveries. At the beginning of each trial, the locations
of the truck, envelope and house were determined randomly, with the con-
straint of being at least 100 pixels (two optimal steps) from each other (on
a screen with resolution 1024 x 768 pixels). When the truck passed within
30 pixels of the envelope, the envelope would appear inside the truck and be
carried within up to the delivery in the house. After picking up the enve-
lope, when the truck passed within 35 pixels of the house, the truck would
be shown inside the house and the message “Congratulations!” appeared
for 300 ms.
The second phase consisted of ten further delivery trials. However, here,
at the onset of each trial, the participant was required to choose between
two packages (Figure 2.4). The location of the truck and the house was
chosen randomly. The location of one package, designated subgoal one, was
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randomly positioned along an ellipse with the truck and house as its foci and
a major/minor axis ratio of 2. The position of the other package, subgoal
two, was randomly chosen, subject to the constraint that it fell at least 100
pixels from each of the other icons. About one third of this second package,
fell inside the ellipse.
At the onset of each trial, each package would be highlighted with a
change of color, twice (in alternation with the other package, and counter-
balanced across trials), for a period of 6 s (1.5 s for each package, twice).
During this period the participant was required to press a key to indicate
his or her preferred package when that package was highlighted. After the
key press, the chosen subgoal would change to a new color. At the end of
the choice period, the unchosen subgoal was removed, and participants were
expected to initiate the delivery task. Importantly, participants had to wait
6s regardless of how fast they chose. The remainder of each trial proceeded
as in phase one.
The third and main phase of the experiment included 100 trials. One
third of these, interleaved in random order with the rest, followed the pro-
file of phase two trials. The remaining trials began as in phase two but
terminated immediately following the package-choice period. It should be
noted that the termination at choice would not make an RL agent value
the subgoal, as termination and choice were independent and choice hap-
pened before subgoal attainment. Participants were told that the first two
parts of the experiment were intended to become acquainted with playing
and choosing. In addition, they were also told that their choices had no
influence on whether a trial would continue beyond choice.
Data analysis. To determine the influence of goal and subgoal distance
on package choice, we plotted the choices on a standard ellipse. Because
the ratio of major/minor axis was constant, all house-truck-envelope triplets
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could be transformed to a standardized ellipse.3 This allowed to look at the
raw choices. To quantify the degree of influence of each type of distance
we conducted a logistic regression on the choice data from phase three.
Regressors included (1) the ratio of the distances from the truck to subgoal
one and subgoal two, and (2) the ratio of the distances from the truck to the
house through subgoal one and subgoal two. To test for significance across
subjects, we carried out a two-tailed t test on the population of regression
coefficients.
To further characterize the results, we fitted two RL models to each
participant’s phase-three choice data. One model assigned primary reward
only to goal attainment and so was indifferent to subgoal distance per se.
A second model assigned primary reward to the subgoal as well to the goal.
Value in the first case was the discounted number of steps to the goal, and
in the second case it was a sum of discounted number of steps to the subgoal
and to the goal. Choice was modeled using a softmax function, including
a free inverse temperature parameter. The fmincon function in MATLAB
was used to fit discount factor and inverse temperature parameters for both
models and reward magnitude for subgoal attainment for the second model.
We then compared the fits of the two models calculating Bayes factor for
each participant and performing a two-tailed t test on the factors.
Results
The scatter plot on Figure 2.5 shows a clear dissociation of choices based on
an ellipse. If subgoal 2 fell within the ellipse, its total distance to be travelled
would be smaller than the distance for the reference envelope. The converse
would happen if the second envelope was outside of the ellipse. This plot
3Because of a technical problem only some ellipses had this ratio, others had a ratio
of 5/3. For this reason not all choices could be standardized, as in Figure 2.5. However,
this had no impact on the logistic regression.
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suggested that the only factor governing choice was the total distance to be
travelled passing through the envelope.
The results of the logistic regression confirmed this influence (see Fig-
ure 2.6). The average coefficient for goal distance was −7.66 (SD = 3.5,
p < .001), whereas for subgoal distance −.16 (SD = .9, p = .43; see Fig-
ure 2.6). All participants, except two, showed large negative coefficients to
goal distance. At an individual level, none of coefficients for subgoal dis-
tance provided a significant fit. The latter observation held even in a subset
of trials where the two delivery options were closely matched in terms of
overall distance (with ratios of overall goal distance between .8 and 1.2).
The model fits yielded converging results, being that the Bayes factor was
4.31, thus favoring the simpler model with primary reward only at the goal.
Discussion
Participants overwhelmingly preferred subgoals that minimized overall path
travelled. This held even in pairs of subgoals that differed little in their goal
distance or subgoals that involved an initial travel in the opposite direction
to the house. The absence of a significant trend for the subgoal coefficients
at the population level strongly mitigates against attaching reward to the
attainment of the envelope. The test at the population level could however
fail to find individual differences or opposing effects. At the individual
level, no fit of the logistic model yielded a significant contribution of subgoal
distance. It could still be the case that opposing effects could happen within
the same participant. If this were the case, we would be able to see a “cloud”
of chosen subgoals around the house, when inspecting the raw data points
plotted on the transformed ellipse, which we did not observe (Figure 2.5).
Overall these results are consistent with HRL, in that subgoals do not
trade off with goals, and goals dominate choice. These findings reassure
that any manipulation of the subgoal does not yield changes in primary or
secondary reward. They do not guarantee, however, that subgoal attain-
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ment has something akin to pseudo-reward. This is suggested by the last
experiment in this chapter, and by an exclusion of alternative hypotheses
for the neural findings in the subsequent chapters.
2.3 Testing Subgoal Approach Behavior
In the previous section there was no observable influence of pseudo-reward
on choice behavior, when pitted against reward. However, HRL predicts
that when an agent is executing an option, choice should be influenced by
option-specific values, driven by pseudo-reward, independently of the top-
level value. Moreover, this effect should be clearer when choosing between
subgoals of equal goal distance. We would like to ascertain whether this
would be the case in two separate experiments (each with a different set
of participants). The first experiment offers choice after participants have
started to head towards the subgoal. The second experiment also presents
choices while the participant is within the option, with the addition that
these subgoals have the same overall distance to the goal.
Methods: choice while executing an option
Twenty-two participants (M = 19.4, SD = .87, 15 male) played a video
game very similar to the one described before. Task and procedure were
the same in all aspects with the exception that choice was offered after
participants had started heading towards the subgoal. The initial location
of the subgoal was determined to be at least 200 pixels from the house and
from the starting location of the truck, and be on an ellipse with major axis
twice the minor axis (resolution 1440 x 900 pixels). After the first or the
second step, a brief tone was played, the previous envelope disappeared, and
two envelopes appeared. One of the envelopes was randomly located on the
same ellipse as the initial location, with the constraint of being at a minimal
distance of 100 pixels from the house, truck and previous subgoal — this
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ellipse was calculated at the moment of the choice. The location of a second
envelope was determined randomly to be at least 100 pixels away from the
previously calculated icons. After the tone, participants could choose which
of the envelopes to pick up in the same way as was described in the previous
paradigm, by pressing a key while an envelope was highlighted. The rest
of the task proceeded as in the previous experiment. In the second phase,
two-thirds of the trials would end after the choice. We used a similar data
analysis approach as in the first experiment. After obtaining the coefficients
from the logistic regression of subgoal and goal distances, we did a one-tailed
t test comparing the subgoal coefficients between the current and the first
experiments. Unless otherwise stated, the significance of coefficients for
single subjects followed the population trend.
Methods: choice between subgoals of equal overall distance,
after start of the option
Nine participants (M = 20.44, SD = .5, 3 male) played a video game very
similar to the one described before. Task and procedure was the same in
all aspects with the exception that both envelopes were now on an ellipse
(both subgoals are different from the subgoal with which the participant
started the task). The location of the subgoals was determined by placing
two subgoals randomly on an ellipse with a major/minor axis ratio of 2/1,
with a minimal distance of 100 pixels of each other and the other icons.
Results
On both experiments there was no significant increase in influence of the
subgoal relative to the first choice experiment (choice while executing an op-
tion: mean difference = .13, p = .71; choice between equidistant subgoals:
mean difference = .13 p = .66, Figure 2.7). Results at the individual level
were in line with the population trend, in that no participant exhibited a
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significant contribution of distance to the subgoal. As in the first experi-
ment, the distance to the goal drove choices of all participants (M = -3.1,
p < .001).
Discussion
We tested subtler predictions of HRL, whereby people should prefer less
action costs to attain a subgoal if they have initiated the option leading to
that subgoal, and between subgoals with the same overall actions costs. In
HRL, this is dictated by option-specific value functions, reflecting expected
discounted pseudo-reward. Contrary to our predictions, neither cognitive
manipulation elicited preferences for closer subgoals. In theoretical terms,
such pattern of choices is in accordance with a goal-driven reward func-
tion. This would not disprove a hierarchical structure of behavior since it is
possible to achieve hierarchical control without pseudo-reward (e.g., Parr,
1998).
However, pseudo-reward is widely used for independent reinforcement
learning at the level of subtasks (Dietterich, 1998; Sutton et al., 1999), and
the evidence that people learn to optimize behavior locally, independently
of reward (Diuk et al., 2013) strongly suggests a hierarchical reward func-
tion.4 In addition, the medial frontal response to subtask prediction errors,
presented later in this thesis, adds credence to the existence of a separate,
subtask reward function. Indirect evidence for pseudo-reward in this task
might come from a post-hoc analysis of participants’ paths. We tested,
for each participant, whether the path from start to choice was indistin-
guishable from a straight line from start to the pre-choice subgoal location.
This was done by regressing the set of {x,y} points, from start to choice,
onto a line, then subtracting the slope of the fitted line to the slope of the
4We are excluding statistical forms of learning which do not require pseudo-reward.
Though they also yield learning at multiple hierarchical levels (e.g., Saffran & Wilson,
2003), they are usually studied in the domain of perception, and are not tied to reinforce-
ment (Turk-Browne & Scholl, 2010).
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straight-to-subgoal line, and doing a two tailed t test on the distribution
of differences. In this analysis no single participant exhibited a significant
difference from the straight-to-subgoal path (α = .05). This is interesting
because the optimal path for an agent that is not driven by pseudo-reward
is a straight line in the direction of the house, and then changing the course
depending on the chosen subgoal. Nevertheless, given that the there are
only three pre-choice {x,y} points, we cannot safely rely on this analysis.
We can raise several possibilities for the absence of an effect on choices.
Firstly, it could be that any scenario where goal distance and subgoal dis-
tance are pitted against each other eclipses any preferences for the latter.
To our knowledge, there is no precedence for this in the computational lit-
erature.5 On the other hand, competition of information for cognitive pro-
cessing is a widely acknowledged phenomenon in psychology. In perception,
limited capacity leads to processing of only behaviorally relevant stimuli
(Desimone & Duncan, 1995). On this line, there could be limited percep-
tual capacity to evaluate distances simultaneously at a subgoal and goal
level. Another possibility, is that goal preferences more automatically con-
trol behavior, similarly to the precedence of word reading over color naming
(Miller & Cohen, 2001), perhaps driven by an ecological imperative.
However, limited capacity and automaticity do not explain the absence
of subgoal preferences when both envelopes are on the ellipse. One possible
alternative is that participants terminate the option and return to the root
level. In this case, action selection would no longer be governed by option-
specific values, even if the action costs to the goal were preserved, but would
driven by reward. In the next experiment we sought to have choices happen
while performing an option, and to eliminate possible causes for option
termination. A possible candidate for eliciting option termination is the
imposed choice, and the length of the pause (6 s). Thirty-four participants
5If anything, subtask values are given preference over top-level values, something
known as recursive optimality (Dietterich, 1998).
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chose between pairs of buttons. One button brought the envelope closer
and another had the converse effect. Importantly, the change was voluntary
and immediate, in other words, participants could elect not to press any of
the buttons and the change took place with a minimal amount of pause. In
all cases the overall action costs to the goal were respected.
Methods
Thirty-four participants (M = 20.6 years, SD = .92, 15 male) performed ten
deliveries in a first phase. On a second phase, participants could press one of
two buttons in the joystick. At the beginning of the experiment participants
were told that it would be completely up to them to press the button or not.
We avoided using expressions such as “play” with the buttons to discourage
an exploratory bias. Participants could press the button at any point until
picking up the envelope. One of the buttons would bring the envelope to
the point on the ellipse, between the envelope and the truck, that would be
closest to 70% of a straight line between truck and envelope, whereas the
other button would have the opposite effect, bringing the envelope closer
to the house. Both manipulations happened on the ellipse. The change
would take place immediately after pressing a button. In case no button
was pressed, the trial proceeded as a regular delivery. Participants were not
told what the general effect of the buttons was.
There were four blocks of 40 trials, each with a pair of buttons. At the
onset of each block participants were told which pair of buttons was available
for choice. Buttons were numbered as shown in Figure 2.8. To make sure
that participants would not forget which pair was available, we showed the
screen informing about the available pair twice. Buttons were paired based
on similar ease of access (each red box indicates a pair of buttons Figure 2.8.
The effect of each button and the order of presentation of the pairs were
randomly assigned for each participant. For each participant and for each
block, the share of closer button presses out of all presses was calculated,
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and averaged across blocks. A share of .5 meant indifference between the
two buttons. A two-tailed t test was then performed on the 34 average
shares against the the null hypothesis that the mean share was .5.
Results
On average, .48 of the participants pressed a button in a block, with no
difference in pressing rate across blocks (F (3,132) = .179, p = .91). In spite
of this, there was large inter-subject variability (SD = .48). 18 out of 34
participants pressed both buttons on all blocks, 7 participants pressed both
buttons on 3 blocks and played with only one button type on one block, 6
pressed the two button types on 2 blocks, and only one type on the other
2 blocks, and the remaining 3 participants had 1 or 2 blocks with no press
at all. In spite of high press rate, the share of closer button presses was not
different from .5 (M = .48, SD = .32, p = .75). In contrast with the previous
experiments, the population trend around indifference seemed however to be
the result of a mixture of “truly” indifferent and very consistent participants
on both preferences. Figure 2.9 illustrates the spectrum of preference: on
the extremes one participant pressed the closer button on .98 of the trials,
averaged across blocks, and another participant chose the farther button on
.78 of the trials.
We conducted a post-hoc logistic regression, in order to quantify the
degree of subgoal preference in a manner comparable to the previous exper-
iments. This involved assuming that when the participant pressed a button
there were two subgoals of equal goal distance, one farther and another closer
to the truck than the subgoal prior to choice. The data of the 4 blocks was
treated as a single 120-trial experiment. Only trials with a pressed button
were considered. We labeled a random half of the true choices as subgoal 1
and the remaining half as subgoal 2 (the reverse labeling was applied to the
counterfactual choices). With these two subgoal labels, the ratio of subgoal
distances (distance to subgoal1 / distance to subgoal2) was calculated —
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as in the analysis for the previous experiments. We ran a logistic regression
with the ratio as predictor and whether the chosen subgoal was subgoal 1
or 2.
The population of coefficients was not significantly different from 0 (M
= -.16, SD = 1.5, p = .58). In spite of the mean, 11 participants had
a significant contribution of subgoal distance (p < .05 using Bonferroni
correction; 18 participants with uncorrected p < .05, Figure 2.10). These
11 participants had a significantly higher rate of button press, compared
with the remaining set (M = .82 vs. M = .34, p < .001).
Discussion
As hypothesized, choosing while executing an option, and eliminating the
possible trigger of termination (the pause generated by choice) allowed sub-
goal preferences to be revealed. These were distributed on a spectrum of
choice patterns. The results for the subset of participants that preferred a
closer envelope are in line with the posited effect of pseudo-reward (black
dots in Figure 2.10). An HRL agent should show a preference for earlier/less
effortful attainment ot the subgoal. Contrary to our predictions, but in line
with the previous experiments, there was a group indifferent to closer sub-
goals. The subset of indifferent participants might actually be a mixture in
itself, given the trending results for 7 participants. In any case, we cannot
safely affirm whether these indifferent participants had or had not subgoal
preferences. Making the expression of preferences voluntary, and providing
no information about the effect of the buttons, might make “true” prefer-
ences vulnerable to switch costs, and attention to early learning about the
dynamics of the task.
More surprisingly so, we found a group with preferences for farther sub-
goals. These participants informally mentioned that they liked being closer
to the house when picking-up the envelope. In computational terms, this
would be equivalent to preferring for higher top-level values at the moment
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the option has ended. Diuk et al. (2013) has shown that extended values,
dependent on the combination of the values of subtasks, influence behavior
and striatal activity at the end of a task and not as information is avail-
able. This is suggestive of hierarchical valuation, whereby an agent accesses
option-specific values while pursuing a subgoal and only accesses the root
reward function, and top-level values, once the subgoal has been attained
(in contrast with continuous integration of information).6 To be clear, an
RL agent would not show such results, because the action structure does not
reflect subgoal attainment or extended policies, and thus it does not make
sense to posit that Vs=envelope is given more priority in evaluation that any
other state.
2.4 Chapter Discussion
Our data are consistent with an interpretation under which the onset of the
choice stimuli triggers a return to the root level, a shift that does not occur
in the last experiment, where choices are made without such an exogenous
trigger. The latter experiment, importantly, revealed subgoal-related pref-
erences as predicted by HRL. However, the direction and range of these
preferences was a surprise, with an interesting pattern of individual diff-
ences. We interpret these in terms of the pseudo-reward function: some
people favor low-cost subgoal attainment, others prefer to “set up” for sub-
sequent subtasks. Preferring subgoals that prepares for the initiation set of
an ensuing option is the essence of skill chaining, a method of generating op-
tions (Konidaris & Barto, 2009). In either case, the data are consistent with
the general predictions of HRL, and cannot be explained by flat RL, reveal-
ing a scoping or encapsulation of value at different levels of task structure,
and revealing a role for such values in learning.
6Though some models of options with interruption specify that an agent has access to
top-level values even during option performance.
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Regarding the indifferent participants in the last experiment, it is un-
likely that this subset had a flat representation of the task. Hierarchical
representations are immediate to humans, even in situations where they are
not required or are detrimental (Rosenbaum et al., 1983; Badre et al., 2010;
Collins & Frank, 2013). The indifferent participants exhibited a lower rate
of button presses, suggesting that their “preferences” are actually the effect
of exploration. We posit that, when novelty bonuses were no longer at play,
switch costs of pressing a button would eclipse any subtask preference.
In four experiments we examined no attachment of reward to subgoals,
and approach of subgoals while performing an option. There are additional
predictions from HRL, which we have not focused on. Pseudo-reward should
lead to the creation of option policies. Also, after an option policy is learned,
we should observe a transfer effect to another task, which can positive or
negative, depending on the appropriateness of the option to the task at hand
(something we discuss in the last chapter of this thesis).
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A B
Figure 2.3. Implementation of action costs. (A) Illustration of the effect of
a movement command to the right of the joystick — as shown in the figure,
actual displacement on the screen depends on orientation of the truck. After
every movement command the joystick had to be reset from the outer “Move
threshold” (dark blue in the joystick) to the “Restart threshold” (light blue).
(B) An example of two movement commands.
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1
Figure 2.4. Choice between subgoals. The participant would only see the
colored elements (the dashed ellipse and the labels would not be shown).
Subgoal 2 could be inside or outside of the ellipse.
50
−4 −2 0 2 4 6
−4
−2
0
2
4
6
Normalized x coordinate
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 y
 c
oo
rd
in
at
e
 
 
Unchosen subgoal 2
Chosen subgoal 2
House
Truck
Figure 2.5. Spatial distribution of choices for all participants. This figure
represents a minimal and transformed version of the task display. In solid
green and black are the truck and house. The solid black line illustrates
the position of the reference subgoal (which on each trial could be on any
point on the ellipse). The red points indicate a setting where the reference
subgoal (on the ellipse), was chosen. The blue points indicate the converse,
where the reference subgoal was not chosen. As can be seen, there was a
clear demarcation of preferences, based on overall distance to the goal.
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Figure 2.6. Influence of subgoal and goal distances on choice. On the left
are the coefficients from a logistic regression with ratios of goal distance,
and ratios of subgoal distance. The right box represents the distribution of
Bayes Factors, comparing a model with reward at the house, and a model
with reward at attainment of the house and the subgoal. The edges of a
box are the 25th and 75th percentiles, the line inside a box is the median,
and the whiskers extend to the most extreme data points not considered
outliers, and outliers are plotted individually.
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Figure 2.7. Comparison of regression coefficients for subgoal distance for the
three experiments. There was no significant increase in subgoal influence
for choosing while performing an option or for choice between subgoals
of equal distance to the goal. The differences between the experiments
are highlighted below the graph (goal distance, choice while executing an
option). The edges of a box are the 25th and 75th percentiles, the line
inside a box is the median, and the whiskers extend to the most extreme
data points not considered outliers, and outliers are plotted with a cross
inside a circle.
Figure 2.8. Top view of the joystick used for choice. Each block used a
different pair of buttons (highlighted by red boxes). One of the buttons was
randomly assigned to decrease the costs to the subgoal, whereas the other
increased the costs to the subgoal.
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Figure 2.9. Histogram of the share of closer and farther presses. As can be
seen there was a spectrum of preferences (the x-axis ranges from pressing
the farther button on all trials (blue extreme) to pressing the closer button
on all trials (red); in between, the values reflect the share of trials of the
difference between the closer and the farther buttons).
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Figure 2.10. Comparison of regression coefficients for subgoal distance for
the four experiments. The dots in black are single participants with signif-
icant fits for subgoal distance (p < .05 corrected — see text for details on
the test). The differences between the experiments are highlighted below
the graph. The edges of a box are the 25th and 75th percentiles, the line
inside a box is the median, and the whiskers extend to the most extreme
data points not considered outliers, and outliers are plotted with a cross
inside a circle.
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Chapter 3
Neural Correlates of
Pseudo-Reward Prediction
Errors
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3.1 Chapter Summary
• In this chapter we describe tests of neural correlates of PPEs, us-
ing variants of the task described in the previous chapter. In these
paradigms, while the subject is heading towards the subgoal, the sub-
goal unexpectedly jumps to a new location, which varies in initial
distance, but respects overall distance.1
• A first EEG experiment sought to examine whether negative PPEs
(subgoal jumps to a farther location) would elicit a feedback-related
negativity (FRN). This is a potential which reflects anterior cingulate
activity, and a known neural correlate of RPEs. We observed a po-
tential to negative PPEs, with an amplitude and location suggestive
of the FRN, controlling for errors and conflict.
• In a second study we used fMRI with a similar behavioral paradigm.
We found that BOLD signal in dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and
anterior insula increased with the magnitude of negative PPEs.
• In a third experiment we examined responses to positive PPEs (sub-
goal jumps to a closer location). Again we found activity in anterior
cingulate and insular cortices correlating with a PPE. More specifi-
cally, BOLD signal increased with the magnitude of the positive PPE.
No striatal response was observed.
• Overall, these experiments are consistent with a role of anterior cingu-
late cortex in HRL-related processes, signalling an unsigned prediction
error. We found no correlates of signed prediction errors. This is hy-
pothesized to be a result of opposing preferences in the population, as
observed in the previous behavioral experiments, yielding an average
null response in areas that would respond to PPEs in a signed way.
1The first two experiments were published in Ribas-Fernandes, Solway, et al.,(2011).
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3.2 Introduction
Learning in HRL occurs at two levels. At a global level, the agent learns
to select actions and subroutines so as to efficiently accomplish overall task
goals. A fundamental assumption of RL is that goals are defined by their
association with reward, and thus the objective at this level is to discover
behavior that maximizes long-term cumulative reward. Progress toward this
objective is driven by temporal-difference (TD) procedures drawn directly
from ordinary RL: following each action or subroutine, a reward-prediction
error is generated, indicating whether the behavior yielded an outcome bet-
ter or worse than initially predicted (see Figure 3.1 and methods section),
and this prediction error signal is used to update the behavioral policy. Im-
portantly, outcomes of actions are evaluated with respect to the global goal
of maximizing long-term reward.
At a second level, the problem is to learn the subroutines themselves.
Intuitively, useful subroutines are designed to accomplish internally-defined
subgoals (Singh et al., 2005). For example, in the task of making coffee, one
sensible subroutine would aim at adding cream. HRL makes the important
assumption that the attainment of such subgoals is associated with a spe-
cial form of reward, labeled pseudo-reward to distinguish it from external
or primary reward. The distinction is critical because subgoals may not
themselves be associated with primary reward. For example, adding cream
to coffee may bring one closer to that rewarding first sip, but is not itself
immediately rewarding. In an HRL context, accomplishment of this subgoal
would yield pseudo-reward, but not primary reward. Once the HRL agent
enters a subroutine, prediction error signals indicate the degree to which
each action has carried the agent toward the currently relevant subgoal and
its associated pseudo-reward (see Figure 3.1). Note that these subroutine-
specific prediction errors are unique to HRL. In what follows, we refer to
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them as pseudo-reward prediction errors (PPE), reserving reward prediction
error (RPE) for prediction errors relating to primary reward.
HRL
at RL
*
t=1 2 3 4 5 6
a aa a a
V V V VV
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t=1 2 3 4 5 6
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VVV
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Figure 3.1. Learning updates in HRL and RL. In addition to learning
values driven by reward, an HRL agent learns simultaneously at the subtask
level. This is driven by pseudo-reward and involves reward-independent
updates called pseudo-reward prediction errors (PPE, represented by the
lower-facing green arrows) and option-specific values Vo. For comparison,
the lower diagram represents the updates in a flat RL agent. Adapted from
Botvinick, Niv, and Barto (2009).
In order to make these points concrete, consider the video game illus-
trated in Figure 3.2, which is based on a benchmark task from the com-
putational HRL literature (Dietterich, 1998). Only the colored elements in
the figure appear in the task display. The overall objective of the game is to
complete a delivery as quickly as possible, using joystick movements to guide
the truck first to the package and from there to the house. It is self-evident
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how this task might be represented hierarchically, with delivery serving as
the (externally rewarded) top-level goal and acquisition of the package as
an obvious subgoal. For an HRL agent, delivery would be associated with
primary reward, and acquisition of the package with pseudo-reward. This
observation is not meant to suggest that the task must be represented hi-
erarchically. Indeed, it is an established point in the HRL literature that
any hierarchical policy has an equivalent non-hierarchical or flat policy (as
long as the underlying decision problem satisfies the Markov property). Our
neuroimaging experiments proceeded on the assumption that participants
would represent the delivery task hierarchically. However, as we discuss
later, the neuroimaging results themselves provided convergent evidence for
the validity of this assumption.
Consider now a version of the task in which the package sometimes un-
expectedly jumps to a new location before the truck reaches it. According
to RL, a jump to point A in the figure, or any location within the ellipse
shown, should trigger a positive RPE, because the total distance that must
be covered in order to deliver the package has decreased. As supported
by the behavioral experiments in the previous chapter, we assume tempo-
ral/effort discounting, which implies that attaining the goal faster/in less
steps is more rewarding. We also assume that current subgoal and goal
distances are always immediately known, as they were for our experimental
participants from the task display. By the same token, a jump to point B
or any other exterior point should trigger a negative RPE. Cases C, D and
E are quite different. Here, there is no change in the overall distance to
the goal, and so no RPE should be triggered, either in standard RL or in
HRL. However, in case C the distance to the subgoal has decreased. Ac-
cording to HRL, a jump to this location should thus trigger a positive PPE.
Similarly, a jump to location D should trigger a negative PPE (note that
location E is special, being the only location that should trigger neither a
RPE nor a PPE). These points are illustrated in Figure 3.2 (right), which
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shows RPE and PPE time-courses from simulations of the delivery task
based on standard RL and HRL.
To make our computational predictions explicit, we implemented both
a standard and a hierarchical RL model of the delivery task, based on the
approach laid out in Botvinick, Niv, and Barto (2009). Simulations were
performed in Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, MA); the relevant code is
available for download from www.princeton.edu/ matthewb. For the stan-
dard RL agent, the state on each step t, labeled st, was represented by the
goal distance (gd), the distance from the truck to the house, via the package,
in units of navigation steps. For the HRL agent, the state was represented
by two numbers: gd and the subgoal distance (sd), i.e., the distance be-
tween the truck and the package. Goal attainment yielded a reward (r) of
one for both agents, and subgoal attainment a pseudo-reward (ρ) of one for
the HRL agent. On each step of the task, the agent was assumed to act
optimally, that is to take a single step directly toward the package or, later
in the task, toward the house. The HRL agent was assumed to select a
subroutine ( σ) for attaining the package, which also resulted in direct steps
toward this subgoal (for details of subtask specification and selection, see
Figure 3.1, and Sutton et al., 1999; Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009). For
the standard RL agent, the state value at time t, V (t), was defined as γgd ,
using a discount factor γ = .9. The RPE on steps prior to goal attainment
was thus:
RPE = rt+1 + γV (st+1)− V (st) = γ1+gdt+1 − γgdt (3.1)
The HRL agent calculated RPEs in the same manner, but also calcu-
lated PPEs during execution of the subroutine σ . These were based on a
subroutine-specific value function (see (Sutton et al., 1999; Botvinick, Niv,
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& Barto, 2009)), defined as Vσ(st) = γ
sdt . The PPE on each step prior to
subgoal attainment was thus:
PPE = ρt+1 + γVσ(st+1)− Vσ(st) = γ1+sdt+1 − γsdt (3.2)
To generate the data shown in Figure 3.2, we imposed initial distances
(gd, sd) = (949, 524). Following two task steps in the direction of the
package, at a point with distances (849, 424), in order to represent jump
events distances were changed to (599, 424) for jump type A; (1449, 424),
type B ; (849, 124), type C ; (849, 724), D ; and (849, 424), E. Dashed data
series in Figure 3.2 were generated with jumps to (849, 236), C ; and (849,
574), D.
Figure 3.2. Task and predictions from HRL and RL. Left: Task display and
underlying geometry of the delivery task. Right: Prediction-error signals
generated by standard RL and by HRL in each category of jump event.
Grey bars mark the time-step immediately preceding a jump event. Dashed
time-courses indicate the PPE generated in C and D jumps that change
the subgoals distance by a smaller amount. For simulation methods, see
the methods section below.
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These points translate directly into neuroscientific predictions. Previous
research has revealed neural correlates of the RPE in numerous structures
(Breiter et al., 2001; Holroyd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2003; O’Doherty
et al., 2003; Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2003; Yacubian et al., 2006; Hare
et al., 2008). HRL predicts that neural correlates should also exist for the
PPE. To test this, we had neurologically normal participants perform the
delivery task from Figure 3.2 while undergoing EEG and, in two further
experiments, fMRI.
3.3 An EEG Experiment with Negative PPEs
Motivation
Earlier EEG research indicates that ordinary negative RPEs trigger a mid-
line negativity typically centered on lead Cz, sometimes referred to as the
feedback-related negativity or FRN (Miltner, Braun, & Coles, 1997; Hol-
royd & Coles, 2002; Holroyd et al., 2003). This is thought to originate in
the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC, Gehring and Willoughby, 2002;
but see, for an opposing perspective, van Veen, Holroyd, Cohen, Stenger,
and Carter, 2004) and to reflect phasic dopaminergic input to this region
(Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Based on HRL, we predicted that such fronto-
central negativity, suggestive of the FRN, would occur following the critical
jumps (type D) in our task.
Methods
Participants. All experimental procedures were approved by the Institu-
tional Review Board of Princeton University. Participants were recruited
from the University community and all gave their informed consent. Nine
participants were recruited (ages 18-22, M = 19.7, 4 males, all right-
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handed). All received course credit as compensation, and in addition,
received a monetary bonus based on their performance in the task.
Task and procedure. Participants sat at a comfortable distance
from a shielded CRT display in a dimly lit, sound attenuating, electrically
shielded room. A joystick was held in the right hand (Logitech International,
Romanel-sur-Morges, Switzerland). The computerized task was coded us-
ing Matlab (The Mathworks, Natick, MA) and the Matlab Psychophysics
toolbox, version 3 (Brainard, 1997). On each trial, three display elements
appeared: a truck, a package and a house. These objects occupied the ver-
tices of a virtual triangle with vertices at pixel coordinates (0, 180), (150,
30) and (0, -180) relative to the center of the screen (resolution 1024 x 768
pixels), but assuming a random new rotation and reflection at the onset of
each trial. The task was to move the truck first to the package and then
to the house. Each joystick movement displaced the truck a fixed distance
of 50 pixels. As in the behavioral experiments, the orientation of the truck
after each step, and participants had to their adapt their responses accord-
ingly. This aspect of the task was intended to assure that intensive spatial
processing occurred at each step of the task, rather than only following sub-
goal displacements. Responses were registered when the joystick was tilted
beyond half its maximum displacement. Between responses, the participant
was required to restore the joystick to a central position. When the truck
passed within 30 pixels of the package, the package moved inside the truck
icon and remained there for subsequent moves. When the truck containing
the package passed within 35 pixels of the house, the display cleared and a
message reading “10c” appeared for a duration of 300 ms (participants were
paid their cumulative earnings at the end of the experiment). A central
fixation cross then appeared for 700 ms before the onset of the next trial.
On every trial, after the first, second or third truck movement, a brief tone
occurred and the package flashed for an interval of 200 ms, during which
any joystick inputs were ignored. On one third of such occasions, the pack-
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age remained in its original location. On the remaining trials, at the onset
of the tone, the package jumped to a new location. In half of such cases,
the distance between the packages new position and the truck position was
unchanged by the jump (case E in Figure 3.2). In the remaining cases, the
distance from the truck to the package was increased by the jump, although
the total distance from the truck to the house (via the package) remained
the same (case D in the figure). In these cases, the jump always carried
the package across an imaginary line connecting the truck and the house,
and always resulted in a package-to-house distance of 160 pixels. In all three
conditions the package would be on an ellipse defined by the locations of the
old subgoal, the house and the position of the truck at the time of the jump.
By the definition of an ellipse overall distance to the house was preserved.
At the outset of the experiment, each participant completed a fifteen minute
training session, which was followed by the hour-long EEG testing session.
Participants completed 190 trials on average (range 128-231). Trials were
grouped into blocks, each containing six trials: two trials in which the po-
sition of the package did not change, two involving type E jumps and two
type D jumps. The order in which trials of a particular type occurred was
pseudorandom within a block. Participants were given an opportunity to
rest for a brief period between task blocks.
Data acquisition. EEG data were recorded using Neuroscan (Char-
lotte, NC) caps with 128 electrodes and a Sensorium (Charlotte, VT) EPA-
6 amplifier. The signal was sampled at 1000 Hz. All data were referenced
online to a chin electrode, and after excluding bad channels were rerefer-
enced to the average signal across all remaining channels (Hestvik, Maxfield,
Schwartz, & Shafer, 2007). EOG data were recorded using a single electrode
placed below the left eye. Ocular artifacts were detected by thresholding
a slow moving average of the activity in this channel, and trials with ar-
tifacts were not included in the analysis. Less than four trials per subject
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matched this criterion and were excluded from the analysis (less than two
per condition).
Data analysis. Epochs of 1000 ms (200 ms baseline) were extracted
from each trial, time-locked to the package’s change in position. The mean
level of activity during the baseline interval was subtracted from each epoch.
Trials containing type D jump were separated from trials containing jumps
of type E, and ERPs were computed for each condition and participant by
averaging the corresponding epochs. The ERPs shown in Figure 3.3 were
computed by averaging across participants. The PPE effect was quantified
in electrode Cz, following Holroyd and Coles (2002). The PPE effect was
quantified for each subject by taking the mean voltage during the time win-
dow from 200 to 600 ms following each jump, for the two jump types. A
one-tailed paired t test was used to evaluate the hypothesis that type D
jumps elicited a more negative potential than type E jumps. For compa-
rability with previous studies, topographic plots are shown for electrodes
FP1, FP2, AFz, F3, Fz, F4, FT7, FC3, FCz, FC4, FT8, T7, C3, Cz, C4,
T8, TP7, CP3, CPz, CP4, TP8, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, O1, Oz, O2 (as in
Yeung, Holroyd, & Cohen, 2005; F7 and F8 were an exception, given that
the used cap did not have these electrode locations).
Results
The EEG experiment included nine participants, who performed the deliv-
ery task for a total of 60 minutes (190 delivery trials on average per partici-
pant). One third of trials involved a jump event of type D from Figure 3.2;
these events were intended to elicit a negative PPE. Stimulus-aligned EEG
averages indicated that class-D jump events triggered a phasic negativity
in the EEG (p < .01 at Cz; Figure 3.3, left), relative to the E -jump control
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condition.2 This negativity was largest in the fronto-central midline leads
(including electrode Cz, see Figure 3.3, right).
Figure 3.3. Evoked responses at the moment of jump. (A) Evoked potentials
at electrode Cz, aligned to jump events, averaged across participants. D and
E refer to jump destinations in Figure 3.2. The data-series labeled D - E
shows the difference between curves D and E, isolating the PPE effect. (B)
Scalp topography for condition D, with baseline condition E subtracted
(topography plotted on the same grid used in Yeung et al., 2005).
Controlling for response conflict, errors and shifts of attention.
It was important to evaluate whether the ERP effect observed might reflect
error or response conflict detection, factors that have been shown in previous
studies to induce phasic midline negativities (Botvinick, Nystrom, Fissell,
Carter, & Cohen, 1999; Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004; Krigolson &
Holroyd, 2006). To rule out an explanation in terms of error-detection, we
conducted an analysis that excluded trials where errors occurred. Although
there is no discrete criterion for response corrections in the task, it is possi-
ble to distinguish between highly accurate and less accurate responses. We
defined response accuracy in terms of the angle between the perfect joystick
movement (the movement that would have taken the truck directly toward
the package) and the actual movement, setting an upper bound of 22.5 ◦
2Like the ERP obtained in this study, the FRN sometimes takes the form of a relative
negativity occupying the positive voltage domain, rather than absolute negativity (for
germane examples, see Nieuwenhuis et al., 2005; Yeung et al., 2005).
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for highly accurate responses, based on an inspection of the response distri-
bution (Figure 3.4A). For clarity, we also only considered trials where the
package displacement required a change in the truck path spanning at least
45 ◦. Repeating our original ERP analysis, focusing only on trials involving
highly accurate responses, yielded the ERP data shown in Figure 3.4B. As
in the original analysis, the difference between jumps of type D and E was
significant (p = .019).
Figure 3.4. Accuracy, reaction times and evoked potentials conditioned on
these variables. (A) Polar accuracy plot for the movement command before
the subgoal jump. 0 ◦ is a perfect movement in the direction of the subgoal.
Left and right commands are shown collapsed. (B) Evoked potentials at
electrode Cz, aligned to jump events and difference wave, conditioned on
highly accurate responses. Dashed line corresponds to class D events, grey
solid line to E events and the black solid to the difference D - E. (C)
Reaction time distributions for type E and D jumps. (D) Evoked potentials
at electrode Cz, aligned to jump events and difference wave, conditioned on
slow responses. Dashed line corresponds to class D events, grey solid line
to E events and the black solid to the difference D - E.
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The other alternative explanation we wished to evaluate was related
to conflict detection. It was possible that type D jumps caused greater
response conflict than type E, perhaps because a greater time was needed
to pin down the direction to the new package location (more distant in
case D than E ). In order to test this explanation, we adopted the common
approach of treating reaction time (RT) as an index of conflict. Considering
only data from trials with highly accurate responses, mean RT in condition
D (1013 ms) did not differ significantly from mean RT for condition E (M
= 1049 ms, paired two-tailed t-test, p = .39). In fact, unconditioned on
accuracy, mean RT following type D jumps (849 ms) was smaller than that
following type E jumps (926 ms, paired two-tailed t test, p < .01), further
militating against an explanation based on conflict. RT distributions for
responses immediately following type D and E jumps (collapsing across
participants) are shown in Figure 3.4C. RTs in both conditions displayed a
clear bimodal distribution, and the difference in mean RT could be largely
attributed to a difference in the proportion of fast (and relatively inaccurate)
responses versus that of slower (and more accurate) responses. To control
for RT, we limited consideration to responses that fell within the slower
component of the bimodal distribution in both conditions. The mean RT
within the resulting samples (1077 ms for type D, 1075 ms for type E ) did
not differ significantly across the two conditions (paired two-tailed t test,
p = .98), nor did the proportion of inaccurate responses, as defined earlier
(49.98% for type D vs. 55.10% for type E, paired two-tailed t test p = .08).
An ERP analysis focusing on this matched data subset of slow responses
yielded a robust PPE effect (p = .02, Figure 3.4D). EEG correlates of shifts
of attention. Figure 3.5 shows the electrode potential at Cz for conditions
involving a shift of attention (average of conditions D and E ) and the no
jump condition.
Note that, in previous EEG research, exogenous shifts of attention have
been associated with a midline positivity, the amplitude of which grows with
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Figure 3.5. ERP for conditions involving a shift of attention (E and D ;
dashed line) and the condition with no jump (solid line) in electrode Cz. 0
ms is the moment when the package flashes yellow and a tone is played.
stimulus eccentricity (Yamaguchi, Tsuchiya, & Kobayashi, 1995). A midline
negativity has been reported in at least one study focusing on endogenous
attention (Grent-’t Jong & Woldorff, 2007), but the timing of this potential
differed dramatically from the difference wave in our EEG study, peaking
at 1000-1200 milliseconds post-stimulus, hundreds of milliseconds after our
effect ended. In fact, we observed such a positivity in our own data, in
Cz, when we compared jump events (D and E ) against occasions where the
subgoal stayed put, an analysis specifically designed to uncover attentional
effects (see Figure 3.5). In contrast, the PPE effect in our data took the
form of a negative difference wave (see Figure 3.3), consistent with the
predictions of HRL and contrary to those proceeding from previous research
on attention.
Discussion
Like the FRN, we observed a fronto-central negativity to negative PPEs.
Although the observed negativity peaked later than the typical FRN, its tim-
ing is consistent with studies of equivalent complexity of feedback (Baker &
Holroyd, 2011). As mentioned before, fronto-central negativities around 200
ms can reflect negative RPEs (Miltner et al., 1997; Gehring & Willoughby,
2002; Holroyd & Coles, 2002), but also errors (Gehring, Goss, Coles, Meyer,
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& Donchin, 1993; Krigolson & Holroyd, 2006) or response conflict (Yeung
et al., 2004). Post-hoc analyses of EEG data based on RTs and accu-
racy showed that the observed negativity was independent of the variables,
thus suggesting that it was indeed a response to a prediction error. Over-
all, this is suggestive of the involvement of ACC in coding negative PPEs,
and perhaps mesocortical dopamine. In the next experiment we repeat the
paradigm, eliciting negative PPEs, using fMRI.
3.4 An fMRI Study of Negative PPEs
Methods
Participants. Participants were recruited from the University community
and all gave their informed consent. For the first fMRI experiment, 33 par-
ticipants were recruited (ages 18-37, M = 21.2, 20 males, all right-handed).
Three participants were excluded: two because of technical problems and
one who was unable to complete the task in the available time. All partici-
pants received monetary compensation at a departmental standard rate.
Task and procedure. An MR compatible joystick (MagConcept, Red-
wood City, CA) was used. The task was identical to the one used in the
EEG experiment, with the following exceptions. Initial positions of the
icons were randomly assigned to the screen respecting a minimal distance
of 150 pixels between icons. On type D jumps, the destination of the pack-
age was chosen randomly from all locations satisfying the conditions that
they (1) increase truck-to-package distance, but (2) leave total path length
to the goal (house) unchanged. The forced delay involved in the task in-
terruption (tone, package flashing) totaled 900 ms. At the completion of
each delivery, the message “Congratulations!” was displayed for 1000 ms,
followed by a fixation cross that remained on screen for 6000 ms. The first
fMRI experiment consisted of three parts: a fifteen minute behavioral prac-
tice outside the scanner, an eight minute practice inside the scanner during
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structural scan acquisition and a third phase of approximately forty-five
minutes, where functional data were collected. During functional scanning,
90 trials were completed, in six runs of fifteen trials each. At the beginning
and end of each run a central fixation cross was displayed for 10000 ms. The
average run length was 7.5 minutes (range 5.7-11).
Image acquisition. Data were acquired with a 3 T Siemens Allegra
(Malvern, PA) head-only MRI scanner, with a circularly polarized head
volume coil. High-resolution (1 mm3 voxels) T1-weighted structural images
were acquired with an MP-RAGE pulse sequence at the beginning of the
scanning session. Functional data were acquired using a high-resolution
echo-planar imaging pulse sequence (3 x 3 x 3 mm voxels, 34 contiguous
slices, 3 mm thick, interleaved acquisition, TR of 2000 ms, TE of 30 ms,
flip angle 90 ◦, field of view 192 mm, aligned with the Anterior Commissure
- Posterior Commissure plane). The first five volumes of each run were
ignored.
Data analysis. Data were analyzed using AFNI software (Cox, 1996).
The T1-weighted anatomical images were aligned to the functional data.
Functional data was corrected for interleaved acquisition using Fourier in-
terpolation. Head motion parameters were estimated and corrected allowing
six-parameter rigid body transformations, referenced to the initial image of
the first functional run. A whole-brain mask for each participant was created
using the union of a mask for the first and last functional images. Spikes in
the data were removed and replaced with an interpolated data point. Data
was spatially smoothed until spatial autocorrelation was approximated by a
6 mm FHWM Gaussian kernel. Each voxels signal was converted to percent
change by normalizing it based on intensity. The mean image for each vol-
ume was calculated and used later as baseline regressor in the general linear
model, except in the region of interest analysis where the mean image of
the whole brain was not subtracted from the data. Anatomical images were
used to estimate normalization parameters to a template in Talairach space
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(Talairach & Tournoux, 1988), using SPM5 (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm/).
These transformations were applied to parameter estimates from the general
linear model.
General linear model analysis. For each participant we created a
design matrix modeling experimental events and including events of no in-
terest. At the time of an experimental event we defined an impulse and
convolved it with a hemodynamic response. The following regressors were
included in the model: (a) an indicator variable marking the occurrence of
all auditory tone / package flash events, (b) an indicator variable marking
the occurrence of all jump events (spanning jump types E and D), (c) an
indicator variable marking the occurrence of type D jumps, (d) a paramet-
ric regressor indicating the change in distance to subgoal induced by each
D jumps, mean-centered, (e and f) indicator variables marking subgoal and
goal attainment, and (g) an indicator variable marking all periods of task
performance, from the initial presentation of the icons to the end of the
trial. Also included were head motion parameters, and first to third order
polynomial regressors to regress out scanner drift effects. A global signal
regressor was also included (comparable analyses omitting the global signal
regressor yielded statistically significant PPE effects in ACC, bilateral in-
sula and lingual gyrus, in locations highly overlapping with those reported
subtracting global signal).
Group analysis. For each regressor and for each voxel we tested the
sample of 30 subject-specific coefficients against zero in a two-tailed t test.
We defined a threshold of p = .01 and applied correction for multiple com-
parison based on cluster size, using Monte Carlo simulations as implemented
in AFNIs AlphaSim. We report results at a corrected p < .01.
Follow-up analysis. Our experimental prediction related to the change
in distance between truck and package induced by type-D jump events, i.e.,
the change in distance to subgoal, or PPE effect. However, jump events also
varied in the degree to which they displaced the package (i.e., the distance
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from its original position to its post-jump position), and this distance cor-
related moderately with the increase in subgoal distance. It was therefore
necessary to evaluate whether the regions of activation identified in our pri-
mary GLM analysis might simply be responding to subgoal displacement
(and possible attendant visuospatial or motor processes), rather than the
increase in distance to subgoal. To this end, we looked at each area iden-
tified in the primary GLM, asking whether the area continued to a show
significant PPE effect even after this regressor was made orthogonal to sub-
goal displacement. In order to avoid bias in this procedure, we employed a
leave-one-out cross-validation approach, as follows. For every sub-group of
29 participants (from the total sample of 30) we re-ran the original GLM,
identifying voxels that (1) showed the PPE effect at significance threshold of
p = .05 (cluster-size thresholded to compensate for multiple comparisons),
and (2) fell within 33 mm of the peak-activation coordinates for one of the
six clusters identified in our primary GLM (dorsal anterior cingulate, bilat-
eral anterior insulae, left lingual gyrus, left inferior frontal gyrus, and right
supramarginal gyrus). The resulting clusters were used as regions of interest
(ROI) for the critical test. Focusing on the one subject omitted from each
29-subject sub-sample, we calculated the mean coefficient within each ROI
for the PPE effect, after orthogonalizing the PPE regressor to subgoal dis-
placement (and including subgoal displacement in the GLM). This yielded
thirty coefficients per ROI. Each set was tested for difference from zero,
using a two-twailed t test.
Region of interest analysis. We defined nucleus accumbens (NAcc)
based on anatomical boundaries on a high-resolution T1-weighted image
for each participant; habenula, using peak Talairach coordinates (5, 25, 8),
guided by Ullsperger and von Cramon (2003), surrounded by a sphere with
a radius of 6 mm (Salas & Montague, 2010); and amygdala, drawn using
the Talairach atlas in AFNI. Mean coefficients were extracted from these
regions for each participant. Reported coefficients for all regions of interest
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are from general linear model analyses without subtraction of global signal.
The sample of 30 subject-specific coefficients were tested against zero in a
two-tailed t test, with a threshold of p < .05.3
Results
A group of thirty participants performed a slightly different version of the
delivery task, again designed to elicit negative PPEs. As in the EEG exper-
iment, one-third of trials included a jump of type D (as in Figure 3.2) and
another third included a jump of type E. Type D jumps, by increasing the
distance to the subgoal, were again intended to trigger a PPE. However, in
the fMRI version of the task, unlike the EEG version, the exact increase in
subgoal distance varied across trials. Type D jumps were therefore intended
to induce PPEs that varied in magnitude (see Figure 3.2). Our analyses took
a model-based approach (O’Doherty, Hampton, & Kim, 2007), testing for
regions that showed phasic activation correlating positively with predicted
PPE size.
A whole-brain general linear model analysis, thresholded at p < .01
(cluster-size thresholded to correct for multiple comparisons), revealed such
a correlation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; Figure 3.6, case
D). This region has been proposed to contain the generator of the FRN (Hol-
royd and Coles, 2002, although see Niewenhuis et al., 2005). In this regard,
the fMRI result is consistent with the result of our EEG experiment. The
same parametric fMRI effect was also observed bilaterally in the anterior
insula, a region often coactivated with ACC in the setting of unanticipated
negative events (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & I, 2004). The effect was also de-
tected in right supramarginal gyrus, the medial part of lingual gyrus, and,
with a negative coefficient, in the left inferior frontal gyrus. However, in a
3These analyses were intended to bring greater statistical power to bear on these re-
gions, in part because their small size may have undermined our ability to detect activation
in them in our whole-brain analysis, where a cluster-size threshold was employed.
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follow-up analysis we controlled for subgoal displacement (e.g., the distance
between the original package location and point D in Figure 3.2), a nuisance
variable moderately correlated, across trials, with the change in distance to
subgoal. Within this analysis, only ACC (p < .01), bilateral anterior insula
(p < .01 left, p <.05 right) and right lingual gyrus (p < .01) continued to
show significant correlations with the PPE. In the series of region-of-interest
(ROI) analyses, the habenular complex was found to display greater activ-
ity following type D than type E jumps (p < .05), consistent with the idea
that this structure is also engaged by negative PPEs. A comparable effect
was also observed in the right, though not left, amygdala (p < .05). In the
nucleus accumbens (NAcc) no significant PPE effect was observed (tests for
average bilateral accumbens: p = .23 for parametric PPE, .09 for categor-
ical PPE, results were comparable on left and right accumbens, and with
the inclusion of ventral caudate and ventral putamen).
Discussion
This experiment yielded a significant parametric PPE effect in several re-
gions. One additional aspect of the results that deserves comment is the
fact that these same regions did not display a statistically significant cate-
gorical effect. That is, while their activation scaled with the magnitude of
the subgoal-distance increase induced by type D jumps, the mean activation
induced by type D jumps was not significantly greater than that induced
by type E jumps. Two possible explanations can be offered for this aspect
of the results. First, it should be noted that the average increase in subgoal
distance across all trials in the experiment was well above zero. Taking this
into account, on a precise HRL account, type E jumps should in fact have
induced a small positive PPE. For simplicity, in deriving our experimental
predictions, we assumed that the PPE was calculated against a reference
or expected subgoal-distance change of zero. This difference between the
assumptions of our model and a strict HRL account may at least partially
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account for the details of our GLM results. On a more prosaic level, it
should be noted that, across trials, the increase in subgoal distance was
heavily skewed to the right. This may have undermined power for detecting
a mean effect of jump type, making it easier to detect the parametric effect
that we in fact obtained in the main GLM analyses. Further experimenta-
tion is called for to evaluate the merit of these two interpretations. As noted
in the introduction, the design of our neuroimaging experiments reflected
a presumption that participants would represent and perform the delivery
task in a hierarchical manner. However, as also intimated in the intro-
duction of this chapter, we also view our experimental results as providing
evidence supporting that assumption. Specifically, our behavioural study
provided evidence against a non-hierarchical or flat RL account involving
primary reward at subgoal attainment, and the EEG and fMRI results could
not be easily explained by a flat RL account with no reward at subgoal.
In the nucleus accumbens (NAcc), where some studies have observed
deactivation accompanying negative RPEs (Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, &
Peterson, 2005), no significant PPE effect was observed. However, it should
be noted that NAcc deactivation with negative RPEs has been an incon-
sistent finding in previous work (see, e.g., O’Doherty, Buchanan, Seymour,
& Dolan, 2006; Cooper & Knutson, 2008). More robust is the association
between NAcc activation and positive RPEs (Seymour et al., 2004; Hare et
al., 2008; Niv, 2009).
We predicted, based on HRL, that neural structures previously proposed
to encode temporal-difference RPEs should also respond to PPEs. Nega-
tive PPEs were found to engage three structures previously reported to
show activation with negative RPEs: ACC, amygdala and habenula. On a
cautionary note, findings purported to originate in the habenular complex
may be due to spatial spread of signal from other structures, and detection
of habenular activity using fMRI might require methods with finer spatial
resolution (Lawson, Drevets, & Roiser, 2012). Of course, the association
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of these neural responses with the relevant task events does not uniquely
support an interpretation in terms of HRL (see Poldrack, 2006). However,
aspects of either the task or the experimental results do militate against
the most tempting alternative interpretations. Our precursory behavioral
studies provided evidence against primary reward at subgoal attainment,
closing off an interpretation of the neuroimaging data in terms of standard
RL. Given previous findings pertaining to the ACC, the effect we observed
in this structure might be conjectured to reflect response conflict or error
detection (Botvinick et al., 1999; Yeung et al., 2004; Krigolson & Holroyd,
2006). However, additional analyses of the EEG data indicated that the
PPE effect persisted even after controlling for response accuracy and for
response latency, each commonly regarded as an index of response conflict).
Another alternative that must be addressed relates to spatial attention.
Jump events in our neuroimaging experiments presumably triggered shifts
in attention, often complete with eye movements, and it is important to con-
sider the possibility that differences between conditions on this level may
have contributed to our central findings. While further experiments may be
useful in pinning down the precise role of attention in our task, there are
several aspects of the present results that argue against an interpretation
based purely on attention. Our fMRI results also resist an interpretation
based on spatial attention alone. We did find activation in or near the
frontal eye fields and in the superior parietal cortex regions classically as-
sociated with shifts of attention (Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008) in an
analysis contrasting all jump events with trials where the subgoal remained
in its original location (Figure 3.6, jump to E ). However, as reported above,
activity in these regions did not show any significant correlation with our
PPE regressor (see Figure 3.6, jump to D).
If one does adopt an HRL-based interpretation of the present results,
then several interesting questions follow. Given the prevailing view that
temporal-difference RPEs are signaled by phasic changes in dopaminergic
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activity (Schultz et al., 1997), one obvious question is whether the PPE
might be signaled via the same channel. ACC activity in association with
negative RPEs has been proposed to reflect phasic reductions in dopamin-
ergic input (Holroyd & Coles, 2002), and the habenula has been proposed
to provide suppressive input to midbrain dopaminergic nuclei (Christoph,
Leonzio, & Wilcox, 1986; Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2007). The implication
of ACC and habenula in the present study thus provide tentative, indirect
support for dopaminergic involvement in HRL. At the same time, it should
be noted that some ambiguity surrounds the role of dopamine in driving
reward-outcome responses, particularly within the ACC (for a detailed re-
view, see Jocham & Ullsperger, 2009). The present findings must thus be
interpreted with appropriate circumspection. Again, it should be noted
that our HRL-based interpretation does not necessarily require a role for
dopamine in generating the observed neural events.
3.5 An fMRI Study of Positive PPEs
Introduction
In this section we now examine the converse case, where costs for subgoal at-
tainment are suddenly decreased. As illustrated in Figure 3.2, this triggers a
positive PPE. The association between ventral striatal activity and positive
prediction errors is stronger than with negative prediction errors (Seymour
et al., 2004; Hare et al., 2008; Niv, 2009). Therefore, this paradigm is a bet-
ter testbed for the possible association between ventral striatum and PPE.
This of couse assumes that in fact what is being triggered by the jump to
location C is a positive PE. The last behavioral experiment shows that some
participants may show a preference for farther subgoals. In any case, it is
not a neutral event and PE should be triggered. Also, in this experiment
we decided to aim for a strong main effect instead of a parametric effect.
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For that reason all PE jumps head towards a similar location (see methods
section to why this cannot be set prior to the trial).
Methods
Participants. Participants were recruited from the University community
and all gave their informed consent. 30 participants were recruited (ages
18-25, M = 20.5, 11 males, all were right-handed). All participants received
monetary compensation at a departmental standard rate. In order to further
encourage performance, participants also received a small monetary bonus
based on task performance.
Task and procedure. An MR compatible joystick (MagConcept, Red-
wood City, CA) was used. The initial positions of the icons were rotations
or reflections, varied randomly, of a pre-established arrangement of icons of
a predetermined triangle with vertices truck (0, 200), package (151, -165)
and house (0, -200) (coordinates are in pixels, referenced to the center of
the screen, 1024 x 768 pixels).
On every trial, after the first, second or third truck movement, a brief
tone occurred and the package flashed for an interval of 900 ms, during
which any joystick inputs were ignored. On one third of such occasions, the
package remained in its original location. On the remaining trials, at the
onset of the tone, the package jumped to a new location. In half of such
cases, the distance between the packages new position and the truck position
was unchanged by the jump (case E in Figure 3.2). On the remaining third,
a type C jump would happen, the destination of the package was chosen such
that (1) the distance between truck and package always decreased to 120
pixels and (2) leave total path length to the goal (house) unchanged. At the
completion of each delivery, the message 10 appeared for 500 ms, indicating
the bonus earned for that trial. Immediately following this, a fixation cross
appeared for 2500 ms, followed by onset of the next trial. The experiment
consisted of three parts: a fifteen minute behavioral practice outside the
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scanner, an eight minute practice inside the scanner during structural scan
acquisition and a third phase of approximately forty-five minutes, where
functional data were collected. During functional scanning, 90 trials were
completed, in six runs of fifteen trials each. At the beginning and end of
each run a central fixation cross was displayed for 10000 ms. The average
run length was 6.8 minutes (range 4.7-10.7).
Image acquisition. Image acquisition protocols was the same as in
the first fMRI experiment.
Data analysis. The procedure for preprocessing data was similar to
the one used in previous experiment.
General linear model analysis. For each participant we created
a design matrix modeling experimental events and including events of no
interest. At the time of an experimental event we defined an impulse and
convolved it with a hemodynamic response. The following regressors were
included in the model: (a) an indicator variable marking the occurrence of
all auditory tone / package flash events, (b) an indicator variable marking
the occurrence of jump types E and C, (c) an indicator variable marking
the occurrence of type C jumps, (d) a parametric regressor indicating the
change in distance to subgoal induced by each or C jumps, mean-centered,
(e and f) indicator variables marking subgoal and goal attainment, and (g)
an indicator variable marking all periods of task performance, from the
initial presentation of the icons to the end of the trial. Also included were
head motion parameters, and first to third order polynomial regressors to
regress out scanner drift effects.
Group analysis. For each regressor and for each voxel we tested the
sample of 30 subject-specific coefficients against zero in a two-tailed t test.
We defined a threshold of p = .01 and applied correction for multiple com-
parison based on cluster size, using Monte Carlo simulations as implemented
in AFNIs AlphaSim. We report results at a corrected p < .01.
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Region of interest analysis. We defined nucleus accumbens (NAcc)
based on anatomical boundaries on a high-resolution T1-weighted image
for each participant; habenula, using peak Talairach coordinates (5, 25, 8),
guided by Ullsperger and von Cramon (2003), surrounded by a sphere with
a radius of 6 mm (Salas & Montague, 2010); and amygdala, drawn using
the Talairach atlas in AFNI. Mean coefficients were extracted from these
regions for each participant. Reported coefficients for all regions of interest
are from general linear model analyses without subtraction of global signal.
The sample of 30 subject-specific coefficients were tested against zero in a
two-tailed t test, with a threshold of p < .05.
Results
At a whole brain level, in a surprising result, an increase BOLD to C jumps
relative to jumps E was observed in dorsal anterior cingulate and bilateral
anterior insula (p < .05 corrected) (Figure 3.6, jump to C ). Another re-
gion that survived correction was lingual gyrus in a comparable location
to the one observed in the previous study. There was no significant re-
sponse to the variation in subgoal distance. The control regressors E+C
and tone/flash/forced delay showed a similar pattern to the same contrast
in the previous fMRI experiment, of frontal eye fields and superior parietal
cortex (see Figure 3.6). The ROI analysis yielded no significant response in
bilateral NAcc (p = .94, and qualitatively the same result for ventral stria-
tum), habenula (p = .52) or amygdala (p = .14). Results were comparable
results for unilateral tests. We discuss these results in the next section,
together with the findings from the previous studies.
3.6 Chapter Discussion
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex is known to respond to reward prediction
errors (Holroyd et al.,2004, and for a general review Rushworth, Noonan,
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Boorman, Walton, and Behrens, 2011). RPEs, however, are far from being
the only eliciting stimulus of dACC. It is also known to respond to conflict,
errors in performance. We can exclude conflict or error detection given that
reaction times are not higher for correct trials, nor are error rates between
for condition C, compared with E. Though the dACC is not part of the
canonical set of areas that responds to stimulus-driven attention, such as the
temporo-parietal junction, inferior parietal sulcus and right middle frontal
gyrus or frontal eye fields (Corbetta et al., 2008), it can be asked whether
the response we observed is driven by shear visual displacement, triggering
a shift of attention. The experimental condition, C, has less distance or
angle of visual displacement than the control condition, E. Consistently,
these areas responded to the occurence of a jump, C and was observed in
E, rather than C in isolation. By exclusion, we can say that the response
is a prediction error. However, we cannot for certainty say whether it is
a positive or negative PE, particularly given the finding that some people
prefer subgoal locations to be closer, and others farther, independently of
overall distance, though not both.
The dACC has been reported to respond to both positive and negative
PEs with increases in activity, both in BOLD and in single-unit measure-
ments (Hayden, Heilbronner, Pearson, & Platt, 2011; Roesch, Esber, Li,
Daw, & Schoenbaum, 2012, for a review), in contrast with earlier findings
(Holroyd et al., 2004). This type of response is consistent with a learning
model based on surprise (Pearce & Hall, 1980; Pearce, Kaye, & Hall, 1982).
This means that the direction of the effect we observed is not telling of the
valence of the PE. In the behavioral study, we reported a spectrum of prefer-
ences for closer to farther subgoal. It might be possible that for a subgroup
of participants the change elicited a positive PE, for others a negative PE
and for others nothing at all. Crucially none of the PEs is associated with
any change with reward delivery and none of these changes would happen
if people were not representing the task hierarchically.
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In contrast with the dACC, we did not observe any effect in canonical
signed RPE areas, the ventral striatum (O’Doherty et al., 2003), the lateral
habenula (Salas & Montague, 2010) or the midbrain (D’Ardenne, McClure,
Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008). This was true at the whole brain and ROI
level. Either these areas do not respond at all to option level PEs, or their
response is so small that cannot be observed. However, Diuk et al. (2013)
do find responses in the ventral striatum integrating information across an
option, whereas no responses in dACC. The study involved extended PEs,
computed at the end of the option, spanning information about the accrued
rewards during the option. Even though these were RPEs, it means that
VS is receiving information at the option-level and is not solely responding
to changes in flat RPEs. One possible nullifying factor is the spectrum of
preferences in the population. As illustrated in Figure 3.7, if there is a null-
centered spectrum of true preferences, an area with an unsigned response
will reflect both the aversive and appetitive nature of a jump, in statistical
analysis at the population level. However, an area with a signed response
will mirror the distribution of preferences around 0. Unlike the behavioral
studies, our fMRI analysis rely strongly on population level tests, and could
make responses in VS undetectable.
Given that the PPE is assumed to arise from hierarchical processing, it
may appear necessary for us to have established independent of the imag-
ing experiments that subjects represent the delivery task hierarchically. We
have claimed that the imaging data provide evidence both for the PPE and
for the logically prior proposition that the delivery task is performed hier-
archically. Isn’t there necessarily some circularity in this analysis? Despite
the appeal of this intuition, there is in fact nothing circular in our inter-
pretation of the data. To show this formally, let us define the following
terms:
A: The event that the task is represented hierarchically
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A: The event that the task is not represented hierarchically
B: The event that the task gives rise to a PPE
B: The event that the task does not give rise to a PPE
D: Our neuroimaging findings.
On purely logical grounds, it is clear that:
B → A: If B were true, then A would necessarily also be true
A→ B : If A were false, then B would necessarily also be false
Given these two premises, basic probability yields the following two con-
clusions:
P (B | D) = P (D | B)P (B | A)P (A)
P (D | B)P (B | A)P (A) + P (D | B)P (B)
(3.3)
P (A | D) = P (D | B)P (B | A)P (A) + P (D | A ∩B)P (A ∩B)
P (D | B)P (B | A)P (A) + P (D | B)P (B)
(3.4)
Equation 3.3 gives the posterior probability of the PPE hypothesis, given
the neuroimaging data. Equation 3.4 gives the probability of hierarchical
processing, given those same data. Two points are worth noting. First,
there is no circular or reciprocal dependency between the two equations.4
Given the appropriate likelihoods and prior probabilities, the equations can
be evaluated in parallel. It is thus logically sound to draw parallel conclu-
sions from the imaging data concerning both hierarchical processing and the
4The two expressions do of course share terms, and will thus be correlated, but this is no
indication of circularity or tautology As an aside, also note that P (B | D) = P (A∩B | D);
our experiment may be seen as evaluating the joint hypothesis A ∩B.
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PPE. Second, both probabilities depend inversely on P (D | B), the prob-
ability that the data might have been obtained in the absence of a PPE.
This indicates the importance of ruling out alternative explanations for the
imaging results. It is here that the behavioral study comes in, since it rules
out an interpretation of the imaging data based on primary reward at sub-
goal. Naturally, both probabilities, P (B | D) (Equation 3.3) and P (A | D)
(Equation 3.4), also depend on P (A), the a priori probability that the deliv-
ery task is performed hierarchically. Previous research makes it reasonable
to consider this probability to be fairly high: As we have recently reviewed
elsewhere (Botvinick, 2008; Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009), decades of re-
search in cognitive psychology (e.g., Miller et al., 1960; Cooper & Shallice,
2000; Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007), developmental psy-
chology (e.g., Saffran & Wilson, 2003), neuropsychology (e.g., Schwartz et
al., 1995; Badre et al., 2009), functional neuroimaging (e.g., Koechlin et al.,
2003; Badre & D’Esposito, 2007), and neurophysiology (e.g., Fuster, 2001)
indicate that hierarchical representation is ubiquitous, and perhaps even
obligatory in human behavior. The possibility that our experimental task,
with its very salient goal-subgoal structure, might constitute an exception
to this general rule seems improbable. Nevertheless, the importance of the
hierarchy assumption prompted us to consider whether our data might pro-
vide some additional, independent and convergent evidence for hierarchical
processing.
One opportunity, in this regard, is suggested by recent neurophysiolog-
ical research, which has discovered phasic activity within the dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex and dorsolateral striatum at sequence boundaries (Barnes
et al., 2011; Fujii & Graybiel, 2003; Jin & Costa, 2010). We reasoned that,
if participants in our experiment represented the delivery task hierarchi-
cally, such activity should occur at the point of subgoal attainment, since
this marks the completion of one subsequence and the onset of another.
Importantly, the moment of subgoal attainment in our task also requires a
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shift in visual attention; to control for this factor, we used package-jump
events (pooling across jump types E and D) as a baseline, since these events
also require a shift in visual attention but do not lie at a subtask boundary.
The resulting contrast revealed relative activation at subgoal attainment (p
< .01, corrected as in previous analyses) at three points within dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex (Talairach coordinates: 63, 7, 25; -61, 4, 30; and -51,
40, 19) and bilaterally within dorsolateral striatum (15, -14, 25; -12, 11,
19). Relative activation was also observed in left anterior parietal cortex
spanning the intraparietal sulcus, in the right precuneus, in bilateral mid-
dle occipital gyri, and in the cerebellum. Interestingly, the prefrontal areas
identified in this contrast lie near to areas identified in recent neuroimaging
studies aimed at isolating regions responsible for instantiating hierarchical
representations of action (Koechlin et al., 2003; Badre & D’Esposito, 2007).
We refrain from drawing strong conclusions from this apparent correspon-
dence, given the many differences between the task and analysis employed
here and ones involved in those previous studies. However, the finding of
phasic activation in these frontal regions at the subtask boundary within
our task does appear to offer some convergent support for our assumption
that participants represented the delivery task in a hierarchical fashion.
Overall, these findings are consistent with the dACC having a role in
learning through a Pearce-Hall model, at the level of subgoals. What does
this mean? In the study where people could learn the association between
button presses and direction of jumps of the subgoal, while preserving goal
distance, and carry on this choice, we could expect dACC, but not VS,
or lateral habenula, response during learning. As learning happens, and
the association between presses and subgoal locations becomes predictable,
responses in the dACC should be reduced and eventually inexistant.
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Negative PPE
D-(D+E)
Control
D+E
Positive PPE
C - (C + E)
Figure 3.6. Whole-brain results for negative, and positive PPEs. (Negative
PPE) Contrast of jumps type D - (D + E ). Shown are regions displaying
a positive correlation with the PPE, independent of subgoal displacement.
Talairach coordinates of peak are (0, 9, 39) for dACC, and (45, 12, 0) for
right anterior insula. Not shown are foci in left anterior insula (-45, 9, -3)
and lingual gyrus (0, -66, 0). (Control) Axial view (z = 53) of the BOLD
activity for events D and E (p < .01 corrected) contrasted with no jump
condition. Talairach coordinates for the peak voxel for the clusters shown
are (18, -66, 51) intraparietal sulcus, (-27, -12, 54) and (24, -15, 51) for
frontal eye fields. (Positive PPE) Contrast of second fMRI experiment, us-
ing type C - (C + E ). Shown are regions displaying a positive correlation
with the PPE, independent of subgoal displacement, which overlapped with
regions for Negative PPE. p < .01, corrected using cluster size. Color in-
dicates general linear model parameter estimates, ranging from 3.0 x 10-4
(palest yellow) to 1.2 x 10-3 (darkest orange).
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Figure 3.7. Effect of a spectrum of preferences around 0 on the detection
of neural PE responses. Assuming the population of participants had a
similar distribution of preferences as the one observed in the last behavioral
experiment, this will undermine the detection of a signed response (left).
However, in an unsigned case, both extremes of preferences contribute to
an increase in neural activity (right).
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Chapter 4
Neural Correlates of
Pseudo-Reward and Reward
Prediction Errors
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4.1 Chapter Summary
In this last experimental chapter, we describe one fMRI study which aimed
at comparing neural responses to PPEs and RPEs. In addition to PEs
related to subgoal jumps, there were monetary RPEs at the end of each
trial. These were introduced to further ground the comparison between
RPEs and PPEs.
• Participants played a similar spatial delivery paradigm. Two-thirds
of the trials involved a jump of the subgoal. All jump trials elicited
both an RPE and a PPE. The spatial distribution of jumps was spe-
cially designed to uncorrelate RPEs and PPEs, as well as the distance
between the old and new subgoal location.
• We observed an unsigned dACC response to RPEs, elicited by subgoal
jumps. This is consistent with research showing absolute responses in
this area.
• However, in contrast with the findings from the first neuroimaging
studies, there was no cingulate response to absolute PPEs. Though
surprising, this is consistent with the mutually exclusive pattern of
choices we observed in the behavioral studies: participants’ choices
only reflect subgoal distance when there is no change in overall dis-
tance.
• We replicated VS responses to positive RPEs, driven by unexpected
monetary outcomes. There was no response for negative RPEs. No
striatal response was elicited in PEs related to subgoal jumps. In
contrast with research showing VS-dACC co-activation for RPEs, no
dACC activity was observed for monetary outcomes.
• The dissociation between VS and dACC points to the possibility that
PEs related to subgoal manipulations in our task, and dACC activity
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in this thesis, are actually related to violations of transitions (state
prediction errors), but not of reward predictions. Thorough analy-
ses excluded that dACC responses would be due to spatial shifts of
attention.
• Overall, we observed evidence for a process of hierarchical prediction
in dACC. It is a matter for future research whether these responses
drive updating of transitions (as predicted by this last set of findings),
or of hierarchical values (as dictated by our initial predictions). In the
general discussion, we present an experiment seeking to disambiguate
between these two possibilities.
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4.2 Introduction
According to our initial hypothesis, the structures that respond to RPEs
also encode RPEs. This was based on a parsimonious extension of RL to
HRL, and on recent study (Diuk et al., 2013), which found ventral striatal
responses to prediction errors at two levels of hierarchy. In order to directly
address this hypothesis, we tested RPEs and PPEs using the same hierar-
chical spatial paradigm. The predictions were that 1. RPEs can be elicited
using the delivery task — given the clear pattern of choices shown in the
behavioral chapter, 2. PPEs arise in the same region, and 3. unsigned PEs
should be observed in dACC. In addition, 4. we benchmark jump RPEs
against probabilistic monetary rewards, as these have a strong prior for
robust responses in regions involved in RPEs (Niv, 2009).
4.3 An fMRI Experiment Crossing Valence and
Level of Hierarchy
Methods
As a recapitulation of our paradigm, we can elicit different types of PEs
by having the subgoal unexpectedly jump to different points in space. As
shown in Figure 4.1, jumps on the ellipse preserve overall distance and only
change action costs to the subgoal (C - decrease in distance, positive PPE,
D - increase in distance, negative PPE). Jumps to points A and B change
overall distance, but not initial distance, and thus only trigger positive and
negative RPEs, respectively. Because a paradigm with five jump conditions,
including a jump to point E, and a non-jump condition would be infeasi-
ble either in terms of power or duration, we set for a paradigm where all
jumps involved a PPE and an RPE, which were parametrically, but not
categorically, uncorrelated.
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Figure 4.1. Types of PEs. The previous paradigms used jumps to locations
D and E, or C and E. In this experiment PEs were elicited by having
the subgoal jump to random points in eight regions of space, highlighted in
yellow: 1-4 - positive RPEs, 5-8 - negative RPEs, odd - negative PPEs, even
- positive PPEs. Locations A and B depict RPEs without PPEs, C and D
PPEs without RPEs, and location E should not trigger any PE (except for
salience).
Participants. Forty participants were recruited from the Princeton
University community (range 18-27 years, M = 20, SD = 1.78, 15 male, 38
were right-handed and 2 were left-handed, joystick was always held in the
right hand). 8 participants were excluded, totalling 48 recruited participants
(7 for head movement larger than 2.5 mm and 1 for failure to complete
the task on time). All participants received monetary compensation at a
departmental standard rate, and a monetary bonus for performance plus a
probabilistic payment described as a tip, as detailed below.
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Materials, task and procedure. The task consisted of three parts:
a short behavioral pratice outside the scanner, for 12 trials, using a joy-
stick held in the right hand (Logitech International, Romanel-sur-Morges,
Switzerland) preceded a practice in the scanner, a 12 trial practice inside
the scanner, using an MR compatible joystick (MagConcept, Redwood City,
CA) during structural scan acquisition and a third phase of 132 trials (6 runs
of 22 trials) for approximately sixty minutes, where functional data were col-
lected. At the beginning and end of each run a central fixation cross was
displayed for 10000 ms. The average run length was 11.73 minutes.
Participants played a variant of the delivery task. On each trial truck,
envelope and house occupied the vertices of a virtual triangle with vertices
at pixel coordinates (-90, 320; truck), (150, 0; envelope) and (0, -200; house)
relative to the center of the screen (resolution 1024 x 768 pixels), but as-
suming a random new rotation at the onset of each trial. The task was to
move the truck first to the package and then to the house. Each joystick
movement displaced the truck a fixed distance of 50 pixels. The initial loca-
tion of the truck was determined such that it would be at 3 optimal steps of
distance (50 pixels) from the planned location for jumps to happen (0,200).
At this location the envelope was equidistant from the truck and goal, to
allow for equal variance in both positive and negative prediction errors.
Because of variance in performance, participants would never fall ex-
actly on the planned point (0,200). The jump happened when the truck
was closer than 250 pixels to the envelope or 400 pixels to the house —
this approximated a line. When the truck passed these boundaries, a brief
tone was played, the truck and envelope would flash yellow, and joystick
movements were ignored for 900 ms. In one-third of the trials the enve-
lope would stay in the same location. In the remaining two-thirds it would
jump to a new location (see the next paragraph for details on the jump
locations). Participants were told that the envelope sometimes stayed in
the same place, and sometimes it jumped. No information was given about
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the location of the jump. We emphasized that there was no contingency
between performance and the probability of jumping.
Post-jump envelope locations were determined a priori using a Monte
Carlo approach. The space of (x,y) coordinates was sampled to yield an
equal number of positive and negative RPEs and PPEs, and ipsilateral
and contralateral jumps. In addition, we bounded negative RPEs. Nega-
tive RPEs are only restricted by the screen boundaries, whereas the max-
imal positive RPE is a jump to the straight line between truck and house.
Datasets were constrained to have a maximal negative RPE of the same
magnitude as the maximal PPE. Figure 4.1 illustrates each of these areas
of space in an example dataset. After sampling within these boundaries,
we selected datasets that (1) had a mean PPE approaching zero (mean of
PPE distance less than half a standard deviation away from the mean of
the set of samples, which was zero), (2) had a mean RPE approaching zero
(mean of RPE distance less than a third of a standard deviation away from
the mean of the set of samples, which was zero), (3) had a low sum of ab-
solute correlation between variables (was farther than minus one standard
deviation away from the mean of the sum of the pairwise correlations be-
tween PPE, RPE and jump distance), and (4) had a high variance (datasets
with a standard deviation more than one standard deviation away from the
mean of standard deviations; this counteracted the bias for low variability
from the previous conditions). Out of the remaining datasets we randomly
sampled one. Within this dataset we used the same Monte Carlo approach
to look for possible orderings of trials that could allow for an exploration
of values. However, PEs from a model with learning (α = .1) were highly
correlated with those from a model which only reflected the current trial
(α = 1). These sampling and selection procedures were repeated for each
participant and for each task phase.
As mentioned before, because of errors in performance, the jump was
triggered at a truck location that approximated, but not equaled, the
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planned truck location. To ensure that performance would not grossly
change the correlations and the means of PEs significantly, we tested the
selected 40 datasets with an artificial agent with the same accuracy that was
observed in the previous behavioral tasks. Indeed, for the actual datasets,
taking into account participants’ performance, across jump conditions, the
average RPE was close to zero, M = .1 steps, converting distance in pixels
to steps, though with a relatively large variability, mean SD = 1.66 steps,
and a mean maximum of 3.19 steps; and the same for the average PPE
(M = 0, mean SD = 2.02 steps, mean maximum = 4.44 steps). It should
be noted that the means for individual runs could be different from zero.
This was to discourage participants from tallying how many types of each
event had happened in a run. Changes in local distance, between pre and
post-jump, were on average 4.41 steps (SD = 1.7). The correlation between
PPE and RPE was .31, correlation between PPE and jump distance 0,
correlation between RPE and jump distance -.37.
After the jump, participants headed towards the new location of the
subgoal. When the truck passed within 30 pixels of the package, the package
moved to the truck and remained there for the subsequent moves. When
the truck with the package passed within 30 pixels of the house, the truck
with the package appeared within the house. This image was displayed for
200 ms. After this period, a screen was shown with monetary information,
as shown in Figure 4.2.
Participants were paid a flat rate of 150 delivery bucks, a task currency
that would be converted to dollars. Though they were not told what the
conversion rate was, they were told that if they “worked hard a maximum of
$12” could be attained at the end of experiment in addition to the depart-
mental rate. In order to emphasize the cost of distance, gas was deducted
from the flat rate. This was .1 delivery bucks per actual pixel travelled
(truck at the start - truck at the jump - truck at package pick up - truck
in the house), up to a maximum of 100 delivery bucks. This was accompa-
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Figure 4.2. Eliciting RPEs through monetary outcomes. After delivering
the envelope to the house, the truck would be shown inside the house for
200ms. After this period, a brief tone was played and a breakdown of
payment and distance costs was shown for 3000ms, followed by a screen
with probabilistic monetary payment (+25, 0 or -25), accompanied by a
tone consistent with the valence (coin sound, neutral tone, or sad trumpet).
nied by the sound of cash register. After 3000 ms, a probabilistic monetary
reward appeared at the bottom of the screen (see Figure 4.2). This was
introduced to compare reward prediction errors arising from package jump
with reward prediction errors from monetary reward. Participants could get
25, -25 or 0 delivery bucks with equal probability. They were told that this
was not contingent on their performance but that it was worthwhile to pay
attention to this additional payment, given that final payment was a sum
of rewards accrued during all task phases. To ensure attentional capture,
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we introduced a sound at the moment of this information (coin sound for
25, different from the one for the flat rate, a sad trumpet sound for -25,
and a brief tone for 0, all sounds had the same 100 ms duration). This was
displayed for 600 ms and was followed by a fixation cross that remained on
screen for 700 ms. At the end of each run participants would be given a
self-paced break.
Image acquisition. Data were acquired with a 3T Siemens Skyra
(Malvern, PA) MRI scanner using a sixteen-channel head coil. High-
resolution (1 mm3 voxels) T1-weighted structural images were acquired
with an MP-RAGE pulse sequence at the beginning of the scanning session.
Functional data were acquired using a high-resolution echo-planar imaging
pulse sequence (3 x 3 x 3 mm voxels, 35 contiguous slices, 3 mm thick,
interleaved acquisition, TR of 2000 ms, TE of 30 ms, flip angle 90 ◦,
field of view 192 mm, aligned with the Anterior Commissure - Posterior
Commissure plane). The first five volumes of each run were ignored.
Data analysis. Data were analyzed using AFNI software (Cox, 1996).
The T1-weighted anatomical images were aligned to the functional data.
Functional data was corrected for interleaved acquisition using Fourier in-
terpolation. Head motion parameters were estimated and corrected allowing
six-parameter rigid body transformations, referenced to the initial image of
the first functional run. A whole-brain mask for each participant was created
using the union of a mask for the first and last functional images. Spikes in
the data were removed and replaced with an interpolated data point. Data
was spatially smoothed until spatial autocorrelation was approximated by
a 6 mm FHWM Gaussian kernel. Each voxels signal was converted to per-
cent change by normalizing it based on intensity. The mean image for each
volume was calculated and used later as baseline regressor in the general
linear model, except in the region of interest analysis where the mean image
of the whole brain was not subtracted from the data. Anatomical images
were used to estimate normalization parameters to a template in Talairach
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space (Talairach & Tournoux, 1988). These transformations were applied
to parameter estimates from the general linear model.
General linear model analysis. For each participant we created
a design matrix modeling experimental events and including events of no
interest. At the time of an experimental event we defined an impulse and
convolved it with a hemodynamic response. The following regressors were
included in the model: (a) an indicator variable marking the occurrence of
all auditory tone / package flash events, (b) an indicator variable marking
the occurrence of all jump events, (c) a parametric regressor indicating the
change in distance to subgoal induced by each jump, mean-centered, (d) a
parametric regressor indicating the change in distance to goal induced by
each jump, mean-centered, (e and f) indicator variables marking subgoal
and goal attainment, (g) an indicator variable marking all periods of task
performance, from the initial presentation of the icons to the end of the trial,
(h) an indicator variable for delivery of monetary reward (encompassing
the positive, 25, negative, -25, and neutral, 0, events), (i) an indicator
variable for the positive reward, 25, and (j) an indicator variable for the
negative reward, -25. Also included were head motion parameters, and first
to third order polynomial regressors to regress out scanner drift effects. A
global signal regressor was also included. In additional analyses, instead
of indicator variables encompassing signed positive and negative events,
we separated regressors for positive negative events, or included them in a
unsigned way, with one regressor for the jump PEs and one regressor for
the monetary PEs. All parametric regressors were mean-centered after all
changes.
Group analysis. For each regressor and for each voxel we tested the
sample of 40 subject-specific coefficients against zero in a two-tailed t test.
We defined a threshold of p = .01 and applied correction for multiple com-
parison based on cluster size, using Monte Carlo simulations as implemented
in AFNIs AlphaSim. We report results at a corrected p < .01.
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Region of interest analysis. For the first fMRI experiment we de-
fined ventral striatum (including the olfactory tubercle) based on anatomi-
cal boundaries on a high-resolution T1-weighted image for each participant.
Mean coefficients were extracted from this region for each participant. Re-
ported coefficients for all regions of interest are from general linear model
analyses without subtraction of global signal. The sample of 40 subject-
specific coefficients were tested against zero in a two-tailed t test, with a
threshold of p < .05.
Results
Behavior
Participants completed a trial on average within 19.81 steps (SD = 4.31).
The average step for the pause was 5.57 (SD = .49). After a jump, partici-
pants reacted within 1.48 s (SD = .18) and accuracy was 74.5 ◦ (SD = 8.02).
As expected, responses in the jump condition were significantly slower and
less accurate than in the no jump condition (RT: mean difference = 67 ms,
p = .002; Accuracy = .08 ◦, p < .001). This effect was larger in jumps that
involved a larger distance between the two subgoals location (ρ = .09 for
RTs, p < .001, and ρ = .07 for accuracy, p < .001). There was no significant
effect on RT or accuracy of RPE (p = .76 and p = .16 respectively). There
was a small positive trending relationship between magnitude of PPE and
accuracy (ρ = .04, p = .07), and no significant correlation with RT (p =
.45).
fMRI
Jump-related PEs. Across all jumps, we found a robust parametric effect
of jump distance in bilateral frontal eye fields and in posterior parietal cor-
tices. Unsigned RPEs yielded dorsal anterior cingulate activity in a region
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similar to the unsigned PPE in the previous studies, Figure 4.3. In contrast,
we observed no medial response for unsigned PPEs. There were responses
in areas for which we had no a priori hypotheses for: increase in BOLD
in middle frontal gyrus (BA 8), and bilateral medial temporal gyrus (see
Table 4.1 for coordinates and cluster sizes). A separation of RPEs into pos-
itive and negative yielded no significant response at the whole-brain level.
We observed activity for signed PPEs several temporal and occipital areas
(Table 4.1).
Replicating the findings from our previous studies, the jump manipula-
tion (independent of RPE or PPE), elicited robust responses in FEF, pos-
terior parietal cortices, areas related to spatial shifts of attention (Corbetta
et al., 2008), as well as a decrease in ventromedial PFC, posterior cingulate
and retrosplenial cortex (Raichle et al., 2001) — areas whose joint activ-
ity, as the default mode network, often fluctuates inversely with shifts of
attention and task engagement.
Figure 4.3. Effect of unsigned RPE on medial prefrontal cortex. Peak
coordinates are (1.5, 28.5, 29.5), p < .05 corrected.
Monetary PEs. Positive RPEs yielded a trending increase in BOLD
signal in the right ventral striatum (-16,2,-4; p = .08 at whole-brain level)
— the independent ROI analysis yielded the same result of a significant
response in right striatum, p < .05. Responses in the left striatum were
not significant (p = .22). No cingulate response was observed for positive
or negative RPEs at a whole-brain level. There were large differences in
transverse temporal cortex, across positive and negative RPEs, which likely
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reflected differences in the auditory stimuli, given the difference in intensity
for the loss and gain sound and the location in auditory cortex (see Table 4.2
for cluster details).
Table 4.1. Whole-brain clusters for jump-related regressors (p < .05, cor-
rected by volume; size in voxels; t value and coordinates for peak voxel; R.
= Right, L. = Left, S. = Superior, g. = gyrus)
Regressor/Area BA size t x, y, z
Absolute RPE
L. dACC 32 48 3.98 1.5, -28.5, 29.5
Positive RPE
- - - - -
Negative RPE
- - - - -
Absolute PPE
R. middle temporal g. 19 214 4.6 -34.5, 76.5, 20.5
R. fusiform g. 17 59 4.4 -25.5, 50, -6.5
Positive PPE
R. middle temporal g. 19 372 4.99 40.5, 79.5, 20.5
Negative PPE
R. precuneus 7 84 -4.62 -10.5, 58.5, 35.5
R. middle occipital g. 18 53 4.14 -40.5, 79.5, -6.5
R. middle temporal g. 22 48 -4.6 -50, 10.5, -6.5
Jump
R. precuneus 7 4452 13.5 -4.5, 67.5, 47.5
S. temporal g. 41 938 -6.5 46.5, 31.5, 17.5
R. middle frontal g. 6 756 8.90 -25.5, 7.5, 53.5
R. medial frontal g. 8 745 -4.92 -7.5, -40.5, 38.5
L. postcentral g. 3 395 -6.16 37.5, 31.5, 60
R. middle frontal g. 9 221 7.32 -28.5, -31.5, 30
continued on next page
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Regressor/Area BA size t x, y, z
L. middle frontal g. 47 198 -4.67 34.5 , -34.5, -3.5
L. lentiform nucleus - 189 -4.85 25.5, 4.5, -6.5
R. postcentral g. 40 162 -5.40 -58.5, 20, 17.5
R. superior temporal g. 22 141 -4.87 -55.5, 7.5 , 8.5
L. middle frontal g. 8 138 6.09 34.5 , -28.5, 38.5
L. dorsal caudate - 118 6.78 16.5 , -7.5, 14.5
R. culmen - 116 -4.5 -1.5 , 55.5 , -15.5
L. parahippocampal g. 37 98 5.72 28.5 , 46.5 , -9.5
L. cingulate g. 24 89 -4.98 4.5 , 13.5 , 35.5
L. posterior cingulate 23 84 -4.04 4.5 , 49.5 , 23.5
R. lentiform nucleus - 70 -4.21 -20 , 4.5 , -6.5
R. middle frontal g. 47 68 -4.50 -34.5, -31.5 , -3.5
R. lentiform nucleus - 57 4.92 -19.5, -13.5, 5.5
R. parahippocampal g. 37 54 4.62 -28.5 , 43.5 , -6.5
R. cuneus 18 48 -3.64 -4.5 , 76.5 , 17.5
Jump distance
R. precuneus 31 86 4.3 -7.5 , 43.5, 44.5
R. middle frontal gyrus 6 66 4.3 -19.5, -4.5, 59.5
Table 4.2. Whole-brain clusters for monetary outcomes regressors (p < .05,
corrected by volume; size in voxels; t value and coordinates for peak voxel;
R. = Right, L. = Left, S. = Superior, g. = gyrus)
Regressor/Area BA size t x, y, z
Absolute RPE
R. posterior insula 13 149 5.02 -43.5 , 13.5 , 3.5
L. posterior insula 13 108 6.95 43.5 , 19.5, 0
Middle occipital g. 17 96 -4.53 31.5 , 61.5 , 0
continued on next page
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Regressor/Area BA size t x, y, z
R. middle temporal g. 21 59 4.63 -50, -4.5, -10
R. fusiform g. 37 56 4.43 -34.5 , 43.5 , -10
R. cuneus 18 52 -4.35 -16.5 , 76.5 , 26.5
R. inferior frontal g. 9 49 4.25 -34.5 , -4.5 , 30
Positive RPE
Transverse temporal g. 41 362 -6.97 46.5 , 20 , 11.5
Transverse temporal g. 41 350 -5.65 -46.5 , 20 , 11.5
R. fusiform g. 37 203 5.7 -34.5, 43.5, -10
L. fusiform g. 37 92 5.6 28.5, 49.5, -10
Negative RPE
R. superior temporal g. 22 1324 8.67 -46.5 , 13.5 , 0
L. superior temporal g. 22 788 9.06 46.5 , 16.5 , 8.5
R. cuneus 18 249 -5.14 -16.5 , 76.5 , 20.5
L. middle occipital g. 19 210 -5.27 31.5 , 61.5, 0
L. Cuneus 17 188 -5.72 16.5 , 85.5 , 11.5
R. inferior temporal g. 37 96 -4.55 -46.5, 61.5, -0.5
L. thalamus - 85 4.75 4.5, 16.5 , -3.5
L. dorsal caudate - 75 -5.25 7.5 , -13.5 , 11.5
4.4 Chapter Discussion
The aims of this experiment were to compare neural responses to RPEs
and PPEs within subjects and using the same spatial paradigm. PEs were
elicited by unexpected changes of subgoal location, while executing In ad-
dition, we included RPEs triggered by monetary outcomes to further the
comparison with PPEs.
We observed an unsigned reward prediction error in dorsal anterior cin-
gulate cortex (dACC), an increase in BOLD activity with the magnitude,
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but not the valence, of the RPEs. Unsigned prediction errors are part of
learning models driven by surprise (Pearce-Hall Mackintosh, 1975; Pearce &
Hall, 1980; Pearce et al., 1982). This is consistent with previous studies us-
ing single-unit recordings(Hayden et al., 2011), fMRI (Jessup, Busemeyer,
& Brown, 2010), or EEG (Talmi, Atkinson, & El-Deredy, 2013), which
also found unsigned responses in dACC, as recently reviewed in Roesch et
al. (2012). ACC could be responsible for driving learning by association
(together with amygdala, as proposed in Roesch et al., 2012), or use this
deviation for re-evaluation of control (Shenhav, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013),
or option policies (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012).
Alternative interpretations of this response are conflict between courses
of action, and errors (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001;
Holroyd et al., 2004; Ridderinkhof, Ullsperger, Crone, & Nieuwenhuis, 2004,
for a review). However, RPEs and PPEs were not significantly correlated
with either reaction times or accuracy, making it unlikely that the response
we observed was due to these two alternative factors.
Surprisingly we did not replicate the cingulate response to PPEs. What
might be driving this mutually exclusive response to PPEs or RPEs? Pre-
vious studies have shown that people are able to simultaneously process
reward information at different levels of abstraction (Krigolson & Holroyd,
2007; Badre et al., 2010; Diuk et al., 2013). Therefore, this suggests that the
source of competition in our task is not at the level of decisions. It is telling
that the spatial nature of our paradigm is the most evident difference with
previous hierarchical paradigms namely from that of Diuk et al.. On this
note, research on global vs. local perceptual processing (Navon, 1977), and
spatial frames of reference (Behrmann & Tipper, 1999), comes to bearing.
Navon has shown that, in stimuli with both global and local features (e.g.,
a large H composed of smaller s), participants exhibit interference from
global information (identity of large letter) when responding at a local level
(identity of smaller letters), but not the reverse. In Behrmann and Tip-
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per (1999) it is shown that certain types of spatial information cannot be
processed simultaneously. The hypothesis is thus that participants cannot
judge both overall and local distances simultaneously, and that reward in-
centivizes processing of overall distance. This would be consistent with our
behavioral studies, whereby people were only sensitive to subgoal-related
action costs when no evaluation of overall action costs was necessary. In the
general discussion, we present a paradigm to test this spatial hypothesis.
It was also surprising to observe a dissociation between ACC and VS
in jump RPEs. Both receive prominent dopaminergic input from the mid-
brain (Szabo, 1979; Miller & Vogt, 2009), and are heavily interconnected
(Berendse, Graaf, & Groenewegen, 1992; Parkinson, Willoughby, Robbins,
& Everitt, 2000; Croxson et al., 2005; Krebs, Boehler, Roberts, Song,
& Woldorff, 2012). Moreover, these two regions have been extensively
reported to be co-activated in studies examining neural correlates of RL
(Croxson, Walton, O’Reilly, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2009; Walton et al.,
2009; Botvinick, Huffstetler, & Mcguire, 2009; Krebs et al., 2012), and
particularly RPEs, in rodent, and primate research (O’Doherty et al., 2003;
Ullsperger & von Cramon, 2003; Walton, Devlin, & Rushworth, 2004;
Amiez, Joseph, & Procyk, 2005; Mars et al., 2005; Haruno & Kawato, 2006;
Seo & Lee, 2007; Rutledge, Dean, Caplin, & Glimcher, 2010; Hayden et al.,
2011), though not with exceptions (Holroyd et al., 2004; Viard, Doeller,
Hartley, Bird, & Burgess, 2011; Diuk et al., 2013, in this last study, ACC,
among other areas, was observed to be active in spatial violations, though
the reward structure was not as clear as in our study). In spite of the
clear behavioral preferences for closer goals, it is possible that the observed
response is not directly reward-related, but to violations of outcomes,
in other words a state prediction error. Detection of these violations is
actually a core component of some theories of ACC function (PRO theory,
Alexander & Brown, 2011). This would be consistent with two recent
integrative theories of ACC, which stipulate that any signal that requires
107
re-evaluation of the amount of cognitive control (Shenhav et al., 2013)
or of temporally-extended actions (Holroyd & Yeung, 2012). In the next
chapter, as part of future directions, we propose a learning paradigm which
seeks to elucidate the nature of the observed medial frontal response.
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Chapter 5
General Discussion
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5.1 Overview of Empirical Findings
The aim of this thesis was to explore behavioral and neural correlates of
hierarchical reinforcement learning (HRL), not explainable by a flat RL
model. We used a spatial paradigm that was divisible into two subtasks,
each composed of a sequence of actions. From the behavioral studies we
observed several properties of a hierarchical agent:
• Values exist at multiple levels of a task — preferences were revealed
at the root and option level.
• Values at the root level dominate values at option level — in the pres-
ence of a trade off between reward and pseudo-reward, participants
overwhelmingly chose to maximize reward.
• Option-level values were expressed during option execution but not
while executing a different option or a root-level policy.
At a neural level, we sought to test whether the same structures involved
in coding root-level prediction errors (RPEs) would respond to option-level
prediction errors (PPEs). In particular, our main prediction was for a con-
sistent engagement of midbrain dopamine afferents. We found confirmations
of an HRL process at play, though equivocal evidence for involvement of the
structures that code for RPEs:
• Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) responds to option-level pre-
diction errors (PPEs) in a fashion similar to RPEs, evidenced by
metabolic and electrophysiological correlates.
• dACC responds to prediction errors in an unsigned way, consistent
with an involvement in learning driven by surprise (Pearce-Hall
model).
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• No striatal response was observed to PPEs. In contrast, there was
a response to monetary RPEs. No consistent habenular or amygdala
response was detected.
• Evidence is not suggestive of a role of dopamine in coding PPEs.
In the next sections we discuss specific and general future directions of
the work presented in this thesis. In addition, we compare the theoretical
scaffold of this thesis, with other theoretical proposals and corresponding
empirical findings. Finally, we address issues pertinent to an implementation
of HRL that have not been the focus of the thesis: the problem of subgoal
discovery, and model-based options.
5.2 Future Directions
Specific directions
This thesis leaves several issues open for further research. Broadly they
concern explaining dissociations we observed, thorough explorations of
dopaminergic function in hierarchical domains, and assessment of further
HRL predictions.
Spatial determinants of attention at several levels of hierarchy.
We observed that participants either chose taking into account goal distance
or subgoal distance, but not both. Our main hypothesis is that such dissoci-
ation was due to incompatibility of processing global vs. local information.
In order to ascertain such hypothesis, it would be informative to design a
psychophysical study, with no task structure or reward. If competition were
observed in a purely perceptual paradigm, it would give support to the idea
that the absence of neural PPEs in the last fMRI study was due to impaired
spatial processing.
The proposed experiment uses the same spatial locations as in the last
fMRI study (see Figure 5.1). However, there is no cover task: participants
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see three isoluminant icons on a screen, which are only different in their
shape and color. In two-thirds of the trials the middle vertex (blue circle)
jumps to a new location (see Figure 5.1A and B). For 900 ms participants
see the old and new location of the vertex. After this period, it disappears
and participants have to estimate the extent to which the either the overall
or the “subgoal” distance changed (see Figure 5.1C). In the remaining third
of the trials, there will be no jump though participants still have to estimate
the amount of change.
+- +-
A B
C
Figure 5.1. Estimation of global and local distances. Participants play a
distance estimation task between two changing displays. All locations will
be the same as in the last fMRI study. (A) Pre-jump display. (B) Jump
of the middle vertex to a new location (equivalent to a jump of a subgoal).
(C) Estimation of change of local (left) or overall (right) distances using a
slider bar.
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We predict that under situations where overall distance changes, par-
ticipants will be insensitive to changes in local distance. As an additional
manipulation, we can reward each distance discrimination differentially and
assess how does that affect estimation of the other distance.
PPEs in a learning situation. The PPEs in the presented studies
were elicited in a Pavlovian-like probabilistic setting. However, PPEs should
be correlated with future approach behavior as dictated by TD.
We propose a study where both levels of the task hierarchy drift inde-
pendently. Initially, participants become acquainted with the delivery task,
with a single subgoal. In the test phase, they can choose between 3 different
subgoals, illustrated in Figure 5.2A. They do so by entering the respective
colored area on their first step. After the first step the unchosen subgoals
disappear. Each of the subgoals is characterized by independent, random,
trajectories of PPEs and RPEs through time, as shown in Figure 5.2B.
Trials with forced exploration will be introduced.
This experiment would allow to disambiguate the nature of dACC re-
sponse we observed in the three neuroimaging studies. In addition, it would
provide a better exploration of PPEs, as we can obtain the fits for models
with or without Vo based on the choice behavior (similarly to Diuk et al.,
2013).
Manipulating task structure independently of reward-based
computations. The purpose of this experiment is to independently ma-
nipulate task structure, and observe PPEs based on the putative struc-
ture. The independent manipulation of subtasks will be achieved through
prior exposure to statistical structure, as shown in Figure 5.3A, Exposure
Phase. There is ample evidence that people are sensitive to such struc-
ture (Turk-Browne & Scholl, 2010), and that activity in superior temporal
gyrus, and inferionr frontal gyrus, is sensitive to acquired community struc-
ture (Schapiro, Rogers, Cordova, Turk-Browne, & Botvinick, 2013). Par-
ticipants will be divided into three groups, Transition 1, Transition 2 and
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Figure 5.2. Task exploring the role of PPEs and RPEs in learning. (A)
In this task participants can choose between three subgoals, highlighted in
different colors. (B) Each subgoal is characterized by independent drifting
functions of RPEs and PPEs.
Control (Figure 5.3A). They will be exposed to this statistical structure
implicitly, performing an orthogonal cover task such as identification of a
target.
Our main goals are to observe PPEs dependent on task structure (Fig-
ure 5.3B), and determine whether there is a relationship between the way
participants encode the task structure and the degree of abstraction in
PPEs. This would be done by correlating a mixture parameter (w) with
similarity scores between stimuli within and across putative subtasks (Fig-
ure 5.3D) from activity in the temporal and frontal lobes (Schapiro et al.,
2013, Figure 5.3D), during the Exposure Phase.
The Reward Phase of the task is very similar to the hierarchical task pre-
sented in Diuk et al. (2013). Participants have to choose between two casinos
(Pillared houses in Figure 5.3B). Each casino is characterized by a distri-
bution of “points”, and a sequence of fractals. Upon choice, the amount of
points necessary to leave the casino with additional money, is shown by a
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dashed bar (Figure 5.3B). Points are earned by observing the outcome of
the fractal bandits (lower level sequence of fractals in Figure 5.3B). If the
amount of points is not attained, they participants leave the casino losing
a certain amount. Each fractal is associated with a drifting probability of
points, shown in Figure 5.3C, thus allowing continuous learning. Partic-
ipants have no control over the sequence that is shown, in contrast with
Diuk et al.. Trials from the Exposure Phase will be repeated in the Reward
Phase, so that the induced structure is not forgotten.
Ventral striatum should be sensitive to PPEs at level 1 for participants
in all three groups. Responses for PPEs at level 2 should depend statistical
relationships between the fractals which participants were exposed to. Par-
ticipants in groups Transition 1 and 2 should show extended PPEs at the
2nd and 3rd fractals respectively, whereas the control group should show no
second level PPEs. The extent to which neural PPEs reflect this mixture
of simultaneous PPEs at different levels, coded in the w parameter, should
be correlated at the population level with the similarity between these two
fractals.
Triggering PPEs while imaging midbrain dopaminergic nuclei.
The midbrain dopaminergic nuclei are notoriously difficult to image, due
to proximity to the basilar artery and susceptibility to cardiac interference
(D’Ardenne et al., 2008). For this reason, it would be interesting to repeat
the tasks presented in this thesis, and the one used in Diuk et al. (2013),
while using methods appropriate for brainstem imaging.
Assessing preSMA activity in option policies and subsequent
transfer. Single-neuron recordings in preSMA have shown neural responses
to code for particular sequences of behavior (Shima et al., 1996; Nakamura
et al., 1998; Shima & Tanji, 2000; Bor et al., 2003; Kennerley et al., 2004;
Averbeck & Lee, 2007; Shima et al., 2007). According to model-free options,
task structure should determined that certain states are associated with
pseudo-reward, and thus independently reinforced.
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The experimental group will be exposed to an MDP (MDP 1e, Fig-
ure 5.4A) with reward at one point and a perceptually salient intermediate
state (subgoal). The MDP consists of states (images such as the fractals
before), connected through arbitrary key pressings. If participants in this
group treat the perceptually salient state as subgoal, and associate pseudo-
reward with its attainment, then the policy leading to it (πo) should be
independently reinforced (Figure 5.4A, and see the section on subgoal dis-
covery). In contrast, the control group exposed to MDP 1c, which has no
parsing cues, should show no independent learning of a subpolicy. In a
second session, both groups play in MDP 2 which only shares the subset
of states leading to the subgoal (Figure 5.4B). We will assess how fast the
experimental group learns the optimal policy (Figure 5.4C), which includes
the previously learned option policy, compared with the control group. In
addition, acquisition of option cached values predicts that the experimental
group should show resistance to local devaluation (Figure 5.4C, “Devalua-
tion” ). We will perform this by introducing higher moving costs at certain
transitions. In a single experiment we thus show positive and negative
transfer effects of option policies.
Neurally, we posit that the extent to which an individual participant
shows transfer of option policies should depend of the robustness of neural
responses in preSMA. In addition, it should correlate with the caudality of
striatal responses (Yin & Knowlton, 2006; Tricomi, Balleine, & ODoherty,
2009), consistent with a shift to habitual responses.
General directions
There is more in HRL than option-specific policies, PPEs, and extended
PEs (see Figure 5.5A for a recapitulation of the neural mappings proposed
for HRL). Future explorations of neural HRL should include tests of option
identification, likely to reside in DLPFC (o in Figure 5.5A), explorations
of the origin of pseudo-reward, Ro(s), observations of the influence of task
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structure in top-level values, and identification of the neural correlates of
option-specific values, Vo(s). In addition to these tests, it would be inter-
esting to test whether the neural substrates for options are shared with
those of state abstraction (e.g., Badre et al., 2010), even though the options
framework usually does not employ state abstraction.
Further functional resolution can be achieved by manipulating the puta-
tive substrates of HRL. On this note, studies with functional disconnection
(e.g., Parkinson et al., 2000), neuronal lesion (Yin, Knowlton, & Balleine,
2004), stimulation (Witten et al., 2011), and neural representation (Mulder,
Nordquist, Örgüt, & Pennartz, 2003) would be decisive for the study of op-
tions. To our knowledge there are no animal studies directly addressing
HRL hypotheses.
5.3 Comparison with Other Relevant Proposals
In this section we compare the neural HRL framework with other recent RL
and non-RL accounts of hierarchical behavior.
5.3.1 Other RL models of hierarchical behavior
Haruno and Kawato (2006). The authors put forth a model of state ab-
straction along corticostriatal loops. In addition, they specify that activity
should shift caudally in the course of learning (as in accounts of habitual
learning, e.g., Tricomi et al., 2009), that difficulty of task dictates the loop
that starts learning — more difficult tasks require more anterior loops, and
that the posterior loops receive information from anterior loops.
In the model each loop keeps a specific Q value. The anterior PFC-
basal loop computes an RPE using regular TD. The prediction error at the
posterior loop is a weighted sum of the RPE of the anterior loop and a
local RPE. Thus the term heterarchical. They present fMRI evidence for
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the shift from caudate to putamen throughout learning, and confirm teh
weighted PEs throughout the striatum.
Frank and Badre (2012). The authors offer a brain-based account of
rule representation, according to RL. The model learns rules (stimuli-button
press mappings) of a task presented in Badre et al. (2010). Stimuli have
four dimensions and depending on the condition (hierarchical or flat), all
dimensions might be relevant (flat) or the value in one dimension instructs
which other dimensions to pay attention to, or to ignore. There is then, in
the hierarchical condition, the potential for abstraction, i.e., for removing
irrelevant dimensions. The authors provide a mechanistic account of previ-
ous neuroimaging data, showing segregation of abstract representations in
DLPC (Badre et al., 2010), and correlate model behavior with individual
performance in the task.
The model is a variant of the Prefrontal Basal Ganglia Working Memory
model (PBWM, O’Reilly & Frank, 2006). This is a connectionist architec-
ture where layers are connected according to the pattern of connectivity
between PFC, midbrain and striatum. In Frank and Badre, the number
of layers in PFC is extended to incorporate the rostrocaudal hypothesis of
LPFC according to abstraction (Badre & D’Esposito, 2007).
The contribution of this paper was to show how abstract mappings can
arise in PFC, without previously specifying them, drawing neuroimaging,
behavioral and theoretical approaches. One caveat is that the architecture
of the task is drawn into the model — “PFC” layer has the exact same
number of units as possible abstract dimensions in the task (compare with
Botvinick & Plaut, 2004, where no division of labor happens in hidden
units).
Notable differences with options are the focus on state, instead of tempo-
ral, abstraction — though they might be both subserved by PFC and striatal
loops; the use of a single dopaminergic signal for all levels of abstraction
— dopamine gates relevant information into working memory — instead
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of several independent teaching signals as posited in this thesis (RPEs and
PPEs).
Ito and Doya (2011). This is similar to the previous accounts in
that a division of labor is proposed along corticostriatal loops according
to different levels of abstraction. In general, this is a proposal that res-
onates with options, though the link is not formally made. They posit
that multiple Q values are learned at different levels of abstraction, simul-
taneously. In this framework, values of different abstraction are mapped
onto the striatum: dorsolateral — more primitive, medioventral — more
abstract. Curiously, this is the opposite of what is proposed by Bornstein
and Daw (2011). Though they mention HRL, this is not a computational
account, and the purpose is to propose an allocation of temporally abstract
learning in corticostriatal loops.
Holroyd and Yeung (2011), and Holroyd and Yeung (2012).
This proposal advances a theory of dorsal ACC in maintenance of
temporally-extended behaviors. They leverage the fact that current
theories cannot explain the effects of ACC lesion, producing, in the ex-
treme, akinetic mutism, and at the same time predict the findings of other
theories. It puts together hierarchical RL, research on cognitive control
and human and animal lesions of dACC.
According to the theory, ACC represents the Q value of an option, which
include: control costs of maintaining the option (which would not be present
if an agent acted habitually and flat) and positive rewards accrued through-
out the task (resonating with Shenhav et al., 2013). In case of a lesion,
there is no representation of the overall benefit of an option, and action
selection is based solely on local costs. Based on the Q value, ACC then
guides DLPFC, and afterwards DLS, for implementing the option-specific
policy. Recently, the authors have simulated the effect of ACC lesions and
compared performance with other theories (Holroyd & McClure, submit-
ted).
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5.3.2 Non-RL models of hierarchical behavior
Representing hierarchical behavior, symbolic vs connectionist
models. This distinction has mostly figured in preRL research of hierar-
chical behavioral (see Frank & Badre, 2012, for proposing a connectionist
model of hierarchical RL), even though it is also relevant in HRL models,
particularly in exploration of neural correlates. This is because, as pointed
in Uithol et al. (2012), the action hierarchy might not have parallels in the
control hierarchy.
In symbolic models (e.g., Miller et al., 1960; Estes, 1972; Norman &
Shallice, 1986; Cooper & Shallice, 2000; Koechlin et al., 2003; Crump &
Logan, 2010), there is a one-to-one mapping between control units and an
action effect (stir in coffee, go to doctor, ...) and often the relationship
between actions is built in. These models are important in describing as-
pects of behavior. However, they offer no account of how the units are
learned, may import too many assumptions on the relationship between
units (though for options to be useful, certain relationships between options
must be prelearned, and similarly in MAXQ), and there might be no part of
the brain with an activity mirroring the activity of the unit (Uithol et al.,
2012, though this also applies to univariate exploration of RL correlates).
In connectionist models (Elman, 1990, and Cleeremans, 1993, as cited in
Botvinick, 2008; Botvinick and Plaut 2004; Botvinick 2007), there is no
explicit, prelearned, division of labor between units. Rather, functions such
as representing the identity of an option arise from the interaction between
units. The contrast has been clearly made in Botvinick and Plaut (2004),
where the same type of behavior as in Cooper and Shallice (2000) was mod-
eled, without assuming a hierarchy of task units. In this thesis, we review
Cooper and Shallice (2000), Botvinick and Plaut (2004), and Logan (2011).
Cooper and Shallice (2000). This builds upon the theory of ac-
tion selection of Norman and Shallice (1986). The model focused on the
scheduling of control units such that subtasks can be performed without
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conflicting with parallel subtasks. When the inputs to a particular unit ex-
ceed a threshold, that unit is activated, and all other competing subtasks
are inhibited. The relationship between units is built in into the model.
The authors successfully model routine behavior, including slips of ac-
tion (Reason, 1979), and behavioral deficits following neurological damage,
such as the Action Disorganization Syndrome (Schwartz et al., 1995).
Botvinick and Plaut (2004). The authors use a connectionist ap-
proach to model routine behavior, more specifically the production of coffee
and tea. The model has three layers: input, a recurrent hidden layer, and an
output layer. The input layer includes information about the current state
of world objects, and attention to objects and previous actions (people act
on what they are attending to). Output includes manipulative and percep-
tual actions (attend to object X). Learning happens by back-propagation
of weights after feedback, in a way proportional to the contribution of the
unit to the outcome.
The model was able to capture the similarity of actions in different
contexts (e.g., pour sugar in tea vs pour sugar during coffee production).
This similarity metric is not a feature of the standard options framework,
which might allow for a parametric modulation of transfer. As in Cooper
and Shallice (2000), the model produces regular and pathological slips of
action. In addition it provides an account of learning and a mechanism
for flexibility (a waiter has to adapt actions according to the costumer:
one customer likes no sugar, another likes one scoop and another likes two
scoops).
Logan (2011). This article reviews research (Crump & Logan, 2010,
2010) that uses typewriting as an exemplar domain where hierarchical prop-
erties of behavior can be tested. In order to predict the dynamics of type-
writing, the authors stipulate a model with two levels of abstraction, termed
outer (word level) and inner (keystroke level) loops. Besides temporal ab-
straction, the model also incorporates state abstraction: the information on
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each level is encapsulated (the upper level does not care in which state the
lower level is, as long as it is not in the state of completion). In addition,
each level receives different forms of perceptual feedback.
The authors present behavioral evidence for interference effects at dif-
ferent levels of abstraction. Using Stroop-like tasks with typing color, it was
shown that congruency affects RT but not interstroke interval: suggesting
that interference occurs at level of words and not at keystrokes. In addition,
scrambled sentences are typed as fast as normal sentences, but not words
with scrambled letters. Another experiment showed that priming with a
word benefits future writing of the first letter, but not of other letters in the
word. Moreover, keystroke pressing relies on feel of the keyboard, whereas
word production relies on visual spatial cues on the screen.
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5.4 The Problem of Subgoal Discovery
Throughout this thesis we assumed that subgoals, related reward functions,
and option policies, would be provided. While this encompasses a set of
interesting learning problems by itself, it leaves open the question where
do the options come from? This can be parsed into two questions, how
are subgoals provided and where do the option policies come from? In this
section we will focus on the first question, given that once subgoals are set,
regular, model-free RL methods can be employed.
This is an important question as a particular subgoal can have a detri-
mental or beneficial effect on learning, compared to a flat agent. In addition,
regardless of the usefulness of a single subgoal, adding options by itself in-
creases the space of possible actions, something that was recognized in early
AI as an utility problem (Lehman et al., 1996). As shown in Figure 5.6 in
the rooms domain, the addition of options to the set of permissible actions
has opposing effects of learning time, compared with a flat agent, depending
on which subgoal the agent is given (see Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009, and
Jong et al., 2008, for more examples of negative and positive transfer).
With the exception of “fixed action patterns” — innate stereotypical
sequences, which run to completion, resembling open-loop policies (Lorenz,
1950) — hierarchical behavior is acquired during development through ac-
cretion of subtasks (Bruner, 1973; Fischer, 1980, though “fixed action pat-
terns” can serve as basis for later adaptive behavior, Thelen, 1981), or it can
be acquired through a direct analysis of the learning problem (e.g., Solway
et al., submitted, though the later is more aimed at providing an upper
bound on the best subgoal partitioning).1 Much like this distinction, in the
computational literature some methods rely on direct analyses of a learning
problem (e.g., Şimşek, Wolfe, & Barto, 2005), while others accrue options
through experience (e.g., Bernstein, 1999).
1State and policy abstraction also seem to follow an increasing pattern throughout
development (Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 1998; Bunge & Zelazo, 2006).
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In addition, approaches differ in the main regularity that is leveraged to
identify useful subgoals. One set of approaches identifies candidate subgoals
based on regularities of the state space: using graph-theoretical measures
(Menache, Mannor, & Shimkin, 2002; Mannor, Menache, Hoze, & Klein,
2004; Şimşek et al., 2005; Solway et al., submitted, the latter also uses reg-
ularities in accrued rewards), unpredictability of transitions (Hengst, 2002),
successful trajectories through certain states (Digney, 1998; McGovern &
Barto, 2001), relative novelty of certain parts of the state space (Şimşek &
Barto, 2004, separable from unpredictability, but still related to frequency of
experience, in that it relies on building options to regions of the state space
that are different from the ones the agent usually experiences), or based on
salient perceptual properties of certain states (Singh et al., 2005, though this
also relies on establishing a reward function). Other methods rely on statis-
tics of policies, at individual (Thrun & Schwartz, 1995; Bernstein, 1999),
or evolutionary timescales (Elfwing, Uchibe, Doya, & Christensen, 2007),
or hierarchical imitation of policies (Friesen & Rao, 2010). Another family
of approaches adds options by incrementally changing the reward function,
by shaping (Kakade & Dayan, 2002, externally provided bonuses, much like
parenting), or by setting as subgoals the initiation states of known policies
(known as skill chaining Konidaris & Barto, 2009). Given the several angles
from which an MDP can be carved, there are several attempts to formal-
ize option creation as an optimization problem (Thrun & Schwartz, 1995;
Foster & Dayan, 2002; Solway et al., submitted).
To our knowledge, with few exceptions (Kakade & Dayan, 2002;
Reynolds, Zacks, & Braver, 2007; Solway et al., submitted), these principles
have not been formally tested in psychology. Solway et al. (submitted)
have shown that adult humans are optimal in their parsing of a task with
regard to maximizing reward over the possible trajectories that can happen
in an MDP.
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Research on the neural basis of the acquisition of subgoals is still nascent
(though, for comparison, there are neuroscientific accounts of rule-based
learning in development, Bunge & Zelazo, 2006). Exploring the neural
basis of subgoal discovery has yielded different structures dependent on the
principle behind acquisition: analyses based on the state space might involve
the temporal lobe (Schapiro et al., 2013) and likely the nucleus accumbens,
given the connections with hippocampus (Haber & Knutson, 2010), policy-
based methods might require dorsal striatal or lateral PFC engagement
(Cole, Etzel, Zacks, Schneider, & Braver, 2011), and methods of intrinsic
motivation might rely on the novelty properties of the dopaminergic system
(Reed et al., 1996; Dayan & Balleine, 2002; Kakade & Dayan, 2002).
5.5 Model-based Options
The parallel between the model-free/habitual, model-based/goal-directed
also extends to options (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Daw et al., 2005).
The knowledge of the transition and reward functions is now used to make
hierarchical predictions. In model-based options (Diuk, Strehl, & Littman,
2006; Jong & Stone, 2008), an agent skips over the transitions of primitive
actions, to instead make temporally distant predictions — which state will
it be at the end of the option, and what is its value. This resonates with
the nature of planning in humans, using the example in Botvinick, Niv,
and Barto (2009), “Perhaps I should buy one of those new cell phones...
Well, that would cost me a few hundred dollars... But if I bought one, I
could use it to check my email...”. Computationally, this has the advantage
of decreasing the size the search tree (Hayes-Roth, & Hayes-Roth, 1989;
Kambhampati, Mali, & Srivastava, 1998; Marthi, Russell, & Wolfe, 2007,
as cited in Botvinick, Niv, & Barto, 2009).
The evidence that humans make such extended predictions in the do-
main of action selection is rare, though not without precedents (Solway et
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al., submitted; Huys et al., 2013). Besides the isolated examples, research
on event perception (for a review, see Zacks et al., 2007) and action under-
standing (Mechsner, Kerzel, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2001; Hommel, Müsseler,
Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001) has shown that humans make predictions that
reflect the task structure or the final goal, instead of a focus on the immedi-
ate consequences. Neurally, there is evidence that such extended predictions
are encoded in the parietal cortex (Hamilton & Grafton, 2006, 2008).
A recent proposal and behavioral study (Dezfouli & Balleine, 2013) has
integrated the two modes of control, model-free and model-based, with lev-
els of abstraction. According to the proposal, behavior is best explained
by a composition of habitual sequences — akin to option-specific policies
— which are integrated by a model-based controller. Interestingly, the lo-
calization of habitual and goal-directed regions of the striatum (Bornstein
& Daw, 2011) interacts with proposed striatal (Ito & Doya, 2011), and
cortico-striatal (Badre, 2008; Frank & Badre, 2012) divisions of labor based
on abstraction.
5.6 The Limits of the Hierarchy
Throughout this thesis we have assumed a strict hierarchy building upon
primitive actions. However, RL methods can also be applied to continuous
states (van Hasselt, 2012). Given that behavior is a sequence of muscle con-
tractions (Hamilton & Grafton, 2007), and in principle RL mechanisms can
bypass discretization of actions, what is the evidence for primitive actions?
Psychologically, humans do parse actions, and can do so at multiple
levels of granularity (Schwartz et al., 1991; Zacks & Tversky, 2001), and it
is known that infants and adults are sensitive to such structure and parse
behavioral streams of actions in meaningful sequences (Reed, Montgomery,
Schwartz, Palmer, & Pittenger, 1992; Zacks & Tversky, 2001; Baldwin,
Baird, Saylor, & Clark, 2001), at different levels of abstraction. There is also
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evidence for a neural hierarchical correspondence of control, from muscle
properties, to kynematics, and finally to goals (Lemon et al., 1998, and, as
cited in Hamilton & Grafton, 2007, Jackson, 1889, and Sherrington, 1906).
It is interesting that evidence for an involvement of dopamine in learning
specific visuomotor mappings is mixed (Weiner, Hallett, & Funkenstein,
1983; Contreras-Vidal & Buch, 2003; Isaias et al., 2011), sometimes finding
a sparing of visuomotor adaptation in Parkinson’s patients. Should the
learning of specific kynematic and muscle properties not be dependent on
dopamine, it posits the possibility that the “primitive actions” stipulated in
most studies of neural RL, such as press left to select a bandit, are actually
the ground level for dopamine mechanisms.
In theory, however, learning does not need to hinge on primitive actions,
or continuous muscle properties. Some HRL methods, such as MAXQ or
Feudal RL (Dayan & Hinton, 1993; Dietterich, 1998), can directly learn at a
particular level independently of the bottom level. Though this can happen
in options, there are limiting factors such as the fact that the state space is
the same as the core MDP, and that it is not straightforward to represent
policies that are not fully specified up to primitive actions, and instead
only learn to call other options. An options agent (at least in the rigid
formulation we have been discussing), learning to make a sandwich, would
optimize the existing subtasks, such as “put lettuce”, “open bread”, and
“put cheese”, independently of making the overall sandwich, but would have
a harder time learning that what actually matters is to get a combination
of some bread, with some sort of vegetable plus some cheese or meat. More
flexible models of human learning have been put forth, where agents learn a
probability distribution over intermediate parts of the hierarchy (Wingate,
Diuk, O’Donnell, Tenenbaum, & Gershman, 2013), which can exploit more
sophisticated knowledge structures (e.g, “a sandwich is the same category
as a wrap”, Griffiths, Chater, Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2010). Indeed,
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there is some recent evidence that humans can learn directly at intermediate
levels of the hierarchy (Huys et al., 2013).
Human tasks vary widely in the degree of abstraction (Barker & Wright,
1954). Even though highly temporally-extended tasks might have obvious
hierarchical structure, it might not be useful anymore to exploit hierarchical
structure in the same way it is stipulated in the options framework. Indeed,
it might not be useful to build the subtask “get a PhD”, as it is unlikely it
will ever be transferred. On a speculative note, at this point, the interac-
tion with generalization or the capacity for dynamically setting abstraction
might come into play. Such cap on the current theories of behavior is also
reflected in theories of neural representation of abstraction, which fail to
offer an account for how PFC represents highly abstract behavior (Fuster,
1997; Badre, 2008).
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Figure 5.3. Manipulation of task structure independently of PPEs. (A) In
this experiment participants are exposed to different statistical structures
(Exposure Phase). (B) This structure will later be used to test whether neu-
ral PPEs in VS and dACC (Reward Phase) reflect a weighted sum of PPEs
at two levels of abstraction. (C) The probabilities of points yielded by the
fractals drifts according to a random walk in order to encourage learning.
(D) Test whether at the population level (each dot is a hypothetical partic-
ipant) similarity structure in superior temporal and inferior frontal gyri, as
found in Schapiro et al. (2013), correlate with the weight of abstraction in
PPEs.
129
Control 
(no subgoal state)
Experimental
(with subgoal state)
Start Start
Goal Goal
* *
*
πo
MDP 1e
MDP 2
*
Goal*
*
Start
Devaluation
trial
Reward
in
MDP 2
B C
A
Experimental
Control 
MDP 1c
Figure 5.4. Positive and negative transfer of options. (A) Two groups of
participants play a sequential key press task. In MPD 1e, one of the states
is made to be perceptually salient (subgoal state marked by yellow asterisk,
e.g., by playing a tone), whereas in MDP 1c all states are equally salient.
Once participants have acquired proficiency in this task, they are transferred
to MDP 2. (B) MDP 2 shares an intermediate set of states with MDP 1e,
and none with MDP 1c. (C) Performance in MDP 2. The group trained in
MDP 1e should outperform the group trained in MDP 1c. However, upon
devaluation of any of the state-action pairs in πo, the control group should
show faster avoidance of the devalued sequence.
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Figure 5.5. Actor-critic implementation of HRL and proposed neural ex-
tensions.
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Figure 5.6. Examples of positive and negative transfer in the rooms domain.
(A) Consider the rooms gridworld, where a room is composed of a series of
states, each depicted by a black dot and admissible transitions with links
between the states (green = start, red = goal, orange = corner states, blue
= door/subgoal states). Transitions between rooms happen through a single
state, which we call doors. One HRL agent was endowed with a “get-to-
door” option, another was endowed with a “get-to-corner-of-room” option,
and both agents had a primitive actions in their behavioral repertoires. A
third agent, “flat” agent only had primitive actions. (B) The option “get-to-
door” decreased the time required to reach an optimal policy compared with
the flat agent, whereas “get-to-corner-of-room” delayed the attainment of
an optimal policy. Adapted with permission from Solway et al. (submitted).
131
References
Aldridge, J. W., & Berridge, K. C. (1998). Coding of serial order by neos-
triatal neurons: a ”natural action” approach to movement sequence.
Journal of Neuroscience, 18 (7), 2777-2787.
Aldridge, J. W., Berridge, K. C., Herman, M., & Zimmer, L. (1993). Neu-
ronal coding of serial order: syntax of grooming in the neostriatum.
Psychological Science, 4 (6), 391–395.
Alexander, G. E., DeLong, M. R., & Strick, P. L. (1986). Parallel orga-
nization of functionally segregated circuits linking basal ganglia and
cortex. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 9 , 357-381.
Alexander, W. H., & Brown, J. W. (2011). Medial prefrontal cortex as an
action-outcome predictor. Nature Neuroscience, 14 (10), 1338–1344.
Amiez, C., Joseph, J., & Procyk, E. (2005). Anterior cingulate error-
related activity is modulated by predicted reward. European Journal
of Neuroscience, 21 (12), 3447-3452.
Amiez, C., & Petrides, M. (2007). Selective involvement of the mid-
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in the coding of the serial order of visual
stimuli in working memory. Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences, 104 (34), 13786–13791.
Asaad, W. F., Rainer, G., & Miller, E. K. (2000). Task-specific neural
activity in the primate prefrontal cortex. Journal of Neurophysiology ,
84 (1), 451–459.
Averbeck, B. B., & Lee, D. (2007). Prefrontal neural correlates of memory
for sequences. Journal of Neuroscience, 27 (9), 2204-2211.
Badre, D. (2008). Cognitive control, hierarchy, and the rostro-caudal or-
ganization of the frontal lobes. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12 (5),
193–200.
132
Badre, D., & D’Esposito, M. (2007). Functional magnetic resonance imag-
ing evidence for a hierarchical organization of the prefrontal cortex.
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19 (12), 2082–2099.
Badre, D., & D’Esposito, M. (2009). Is the rostro-caudal axis of the frontal
lobe hierarchical? Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10 (9), 659–669.
Badre, D., Hoffman, J., Cooney, J. W., & D’Esposito, M. (2009). Hierar-
chical cognitive control deficits following damage to the human frontal
lobe. Nature Neuroscience, 12 (4), 515–522.
Badre, D., Kayser, A. S., & D Esposito, M. (2010). Frontal Cortex and the
Discovery of Abstract Action Rules. Neuron, 66 (2), 315–326.
Baker, T. E., & Holroyd, C. B. (2011). Dissociated roles of the anterior
cingulate cortex in reward and conflict processing as revealed by the
feedback error-related negativity and N200. Biological Psychology ,
87 (1), 25-34.
Baldwin, D. A., Baird, J. A., Saylor, M. M., & Clark, M. A. (2001). Infants
parse dynamic action. Child development , 72 (3), 708–717.
Balleine, B. W., & Dickinson, A. (1998). Goal-directed instrumental ac-
tion: contingency and incentive learning and their cortical substrates.
Neuropharmacology , 37 (4), 407-419.
Barker, R., & Wright, H. F. (1954). Dividing the behavior stream. In
Midwest and its children: The psychological ecology of an american
town. New York, NY: Row, Peterson and Company.
Barnes, T. D., Mao, J.-B., Hu, D., Kubota, Y., Dreyer, A. A., Stamoulis,
C., . . . Graybiel, A. M. (2011). Advance cueing produces enhanced
action-boundary patterns of spike activity in the sensorimotor stria-
tum. Journal of Neurophysiology , 105 (4), 1861–1878.
Barto, A. G. (1995). Adaptive critics and the basal ganglia. In J. C. Houk,
J. L. Davis, & D. G. Beiser (Eds.), Models of information processing
in the basal ganglia (p. 215-232). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Barto, A. G., & Mahadevan, S. (2003). Recent advances in hierarchical
reinforcement learning. Discrete Event Dynamic Systems: Theory
and Applications, 13 (4), 341-379.
Barto, A. G., & Sutton, R. S. (1981). Toward a modern theory of adaptive
networks: Expectation and prediction. Psychological Review , 88 (2),
135-170.
Barto, A. G., Sutton, R. S., & Anderson, C. W. (1983). Neuronlike adaptive
133
elements that can solve difficult learning control problems. Systems,
Man and Cybernetics, IEEE Transactions on(5), 834–846.
Behrmann, M., & Tipper, S. P. (1999). Attention accesses multiple refer-
ence frames: evidence from visual neglect. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 25 (1), 83-101.
Bellman, R. (1957). Dynamic programming. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Berdyyeva, T. K., & Olson, C. R. (2010). Rank signals in four areas
of macaque frontal cortex during selection of actions and objects in
serial order. Journal of Neurophysiology , 104 (1), 141-159.
Berendse, H. W., Graaf, Y. G.-D., & Groenewegen, H. J. (1992). Topo-
graphical organization and relationship with ventral striatal compart-
ments of prefrontal corticostriatal projections in the rat. Journal of
Comparative Neurology , 316 (3), 314–347.
Bernstein, D. S. (1999). Reusing old policies to accelerate learning on new
MDPs (Tech. Rep. No. 99-26). University of Massachusetts, Amherst.
Berridge, K. C., Fentress, J. C., & Parr, H. (1987). Natural syntax rules
control action sequence of rats. Behavioural Brain Research, 23 (1),
59-68.
Bertsekas, D. P., & Tsitsiklis, J. (1996). Neuro-dynamic programming.
Belmont, MA: Athena Scientific.
Bonini, L., Serventi, F. U., Simone, L., Rozzi, S., Ferrari, P. F., & Fogassi, L.
(2011). Grasping neurons of monkey parietal and premotor cortices
encode action goals at distinct levels of abstraction during complex
action sequences. Journal of Neuroscience, 31 (15), 5876–5886.
Bor, D., Duncan, J., Wiseman, R. J., & Owen, A. M. (2003). Encoding
strategies dissociate prefrontal activity from working memory demand.
Neuron, 37 (2), 361-367.
Bornstein, A. M., & Daw, N. D. (2011). Multiplicity of control in the basal
ganglia: computational roles of striatal subregions. Current Opinion
in Neurobiology , 21 (3), 374–380.
Botvinick, M., Nystrom, L. E., Fissell, K., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D.
(1999). Conflict monitoring versus selection-for-action in anterior cin-
gulate cortex. Nature, 402 (6758), 179-181.
Botvinick, M., & Plaut, D. C. (2004). Doing without schema hierarchies:
a recurrent connectionist approach to normal and impaired routine
134
sequential action. Psychological Review , 111 (2), 395-429.
Botvinick, M. M. (2007). Multilevel structure in behaviour and in the
brain: a model of Fuster’s hierarchy. Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society of London Series B, Biological sciences, 362 (1485),
1615–1626.
Botvinick, M. M. (2008). Hierarchical models of behavior and prefrontal
function. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12 (5), 201-208.
Botvinick, M. M., Braver, T. S., Barch, D., Carter, C. S., & Cohen, J. D.
(2001). Conflict monitoring and cognitive control. Psychological Re-
view , 108 (3), 624–652.
Botvinick, M. M., Huffstetler, S., & Mcguire, J. T. (2009). Effort discount-
ing in human nucleus accumbens. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral
Neuroscience, 9 (1), 16–27.
Botvinick, M. M., Niv, Y., & Barto, A. G. (2009). Hierarchically orga-
nized behavior and its neural foundations: a reinforcement learning
perspective. Cognition, 113 (3), 262–280.
Boyd, L., Edwards, J., Siengsukon, C., Vidoni, E., Wessel, B., & Linsdell,
M. (2009). Motor sequence chunking is impaired by basal ganglia
stroke. Neurobiology of Learning and Memory , 92 (1), 35–44.
Brainard, D. H. (1997). The psychophysics toolbox. Spatial Vision, 10 (4),
433–436.
Breiter, H. C., Aharon, I., Kahneman, D., Dale, A., & Shizgal, P. (2001).
Functional imaging of neural responses to expectancy and experience
of monetary gains and losses. Neuron, 30 (2), 619–639.
Bruner, J. S. (1973). Organization of early skilled action. Child Develop-
ment , 44 (1), 1–11.
Bunge, S. A. (2004). How we use rules to select actions: a review of evi-
dence from cognitive neuroscience. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral
Neuroscience, 4 (4), 564–579.
Bunge, S. A., & Zelazo, P. D. (2006). A brain-based account of the devel-
opment of rule use in childhood. Current Directions in Psychological
Science, 15 (3), 118–121.
Burkhardt, J. M., Jin, X., & Costa, R. M. (2009). Dissociable effects of
dopamine on neuronal firing rate and synchrony in the dorsal striatum.
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience, 3 (28).
Christoff, K. (2003). Evaluating self-generated information: anterior pre-
135
frontal contributions to human cognition. Behavioral Neuroscience,
117 (6), 1161-1168.
Christoff, K., & Keramatian, K. (2007). Abstraction of mental represen-
tations: theoretical considerations and neuroscientific evidence. In
S. A. Bunge & J. D. Wallis (Eds.), Perspectives on rlue-guided behav-
ior (p. 107-126). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Christoph, G. R., Leonzio, R. J., & Wilcox, K. S. (1986). Stimulation
of the lateral habenula inhibits dopamine-containing neurons in the
substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area of the rat. Journal of
Neuroscience, 6 (3), 613–619.
Cole, M. W., Etzel, J. A., Zacks, J. M., Schneider, W., & Braver, T. S.
(2011). Rapid transfer of abstract rules to novel contexts in human
lateral prefrontal cortex. Frontiers in human neuroscience, 5 (142).
Collins, A. G., & Frank, M. J. (2013). Cognitive control over learning:
creating, clustering, and generalizing task-set structure. Psychological
Review , 120 (1), 190–229.
Contreras-Vidal, J. L., & Buch, E. R. (2003). Effects of parkinson’s disease
on visuomotor adaptation. Experimental brain research, 150 (1), 25–
32.
Conway, C. M., & Christiansen, M. H. (2001). Sequential learning in non-
human primates. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5 (12), 539–546.
Cooper, J. C., & Knutson, B. (2008). Valence and salience contribute to
nucleus accumbens activation. Neuroimage, 39 (1), 538–547.
Cooper, R., & Shallice, T. (2000). Contention scheduling and the control
of routine activities. Cognitive Neuropsychology , 17 (4), 297–338.
Corbetta, M., Patel, G., & Shulman, G. L. (2008). The reorienting system
of the human brain: from environment to theory of mind. Neuron,
58 (3), 306–324.
Courtney, S. M., Roth, J. K., & Sala, J. B. (2007). A hierarchi-
cal biased-competition model of domain-dependent working memory
maintenance and executive control. In N. Osaka, R. H. Logie, &
M. D’Esposito (Eds.), The cognitive neuroscience of working mem-
ory (p. 369-399). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Courville, A. C., Daw, N. D., & Touretzky, D. S. (2006). Bayesian theories
of conditioning in a changing world. Trends in Cognitive Sciences,
10 (7), 294-300.
136
Cox, R. W. (1996). Afni: software for analysis and visualization of functional
magnetic resonance neuroimages. Computers and Biomedical research,
29 (3), 162–173.
Cromwell, H. C., & Berridge, K. C. (1996). Implementation of action
sequences by a neostriatal site: a lesion mapping study of grooming
syntax. Journal of Neuroscience, 16 (10), 3444–3458.
Croxson, P. L., Johansen-Berg, H., Behrens, T. E., Robson, M. D., Pinsk,
M. A., Gross, C. G., . . . Rushworth, M. F. (2005). Quantitative
investigation of connections of the prefrontal cortex in the human
and macaque using probabilistic diffusion tractography. Journal of
Neuroscience, 25 (39), 8854–8866.
Croxson, P. L., Walton, M. E., O’Reilly, J. X., Behrens, T. E., & Rushworth,
M. F. (2009). Effort-based cost–benefit valuation and the human
brain. Journal of Neuroscience, 29 (14), 4531–4541.
Crump, M. J., & Logan, G. D. (2010). Hierarchical control and skilled
typing: evidence for word-level control over the execution of individual
keystrokes. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning Memory
and Cognition, 36 (6), 1369–1380.
Crump, M. J. C., & Logan, G. D. (2010). Episodic contributions to sequen-
tial control: learning from a typist’s touch. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 36 (3), 662–672.
D’Ardenne, K., McClure, S. M., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008).
BOLD responses reflecting dopaminergic signals in the human ventral
tegmental area. Science, 319 (5867), 1264–1267.
Daw, N. D., Courville, A. C., & Touretzky, D. S. (2003). Timing and
partial observability in the dopamine system. In Advances in neural
information processing systems (Vol. 15, p. 99-106). Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Daw, N. D., & Frank, M. J. (2009). Reinforcement learning and higher level
cognition: introduction to special issue. Cognition, 113 (3), 259–261.
Daw, N. D., Niv, Y., & Dayan, P. (2005). Uncertainty-based competition
between prefrontal and dorsolateral striatal systems for behavioral
control. Nature Neuroscience, 8 (12), 1704-1711.
Daw, N. D., Niv, Y., & Dayan, P. (2006). Actions, policies, values and
the basal ganglia. In E. Bezard (Ed.), Recent breakthroughs in basal
ganglia research (p. 91-106). Hauppage, NY: Nova Science.
137
Dayan, P., & Balleine, B. W. (2002). Reward, motivation, and reinforcement
learning. Neuron, 36 (2), 285–298.
Dayan, P., & Hinton, G. (1993). Feudal reinforcement learning. In Advances
in neural information processing systems 5 (pp. 271–278).
Dayan, P., & Niv, Y. (2008). Reinforcement learning: the good, the bad
and the ugly. Current Opinion in Neurobiology , 18 (2), 185–196.
Desimone, R., & Duncan, J. (1995). Neural mechanisms of selective visual
attention. Annual review of neuroscience, 18 (1), 193–222.
D’Esposito, M. (2007). From cognitive to neural models of working mem-
ory. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. B,
Biological Sciences, 362 (1481), 761-772.
Dezfouli, A., & Balleine, B. W. (2013). Evidence that goal-directed and
habitual action control are hierarchically organized. In Reinforcement
learning and decision making 2013.
Dickinson, A. (1985). Actions and habits: The development of behavioural
autonomy. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London.
. . . , 308 (1135), 67-78.
Dietterich, T. G. (1998). The MAXQ method for hierarchical reinforcement
learning. In Proceedings of the fifteenth international conference on
machine learning (Vol. 8, p. 118-126).
Digney, B. L. (1998). Learning hierarchical control structures for multiple
tasks and changing environments. In Proceedings of the fifth interna-
tional conference on simulation of adaptive behavior on from animals
to animats (Vol. 5, pp. 321–330).
Diuk, C., & Littman, M. L. (2008). Hierarchical reinforcement learning.
In J. R. R. Dopico, J. Dorado, & A. Pazos (Eds.), Encyclopedia of
artificial intelligence (p. 825-830). Hershey, PA: IGI Global.
Diuk, C., Strehl, A. L., & Littman, M. L. (2006). A hierarchical approach to
efficient reinforcement learning in deterministic domains. In Proceed-
ings of the fifth international joint conference on autonomous agents
and multiagent systems (pp. 313–319).
Diuk, C., Tsai, K., Wallis, J., Botvinick, M. M., & Niv, Y. (2013). Hierarchi-
cal learning induces two simultaneous, but separable, prediction errors
in human basal ganglia. Journal of Neuroscience, 33 (13), 5797-5805.
Duncan, J. (2013). The structure of cognition: Attentional episodes in mind
and brain. Neuron, 80 (1), 35–50.
138
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